ANDREWW v. SCOTTON.—2 BLAND. 609

considered as the party contracting, or as the real vendor. Gib-
son's Case, 1 Bland, 138.

the State, who could be contemplated, either in law or equity, as interested
in the sale. The former as mortgagee, and the latter was standing in the
place of Semple, the patentee and mortgagor of the land. The Attorney-
General, representing the State, had first agreed to the sale, and he did not
object to it after it had been made, and after the usual notice.

But, after the information the Chancellor has since received, he cannot
hesitate to declare his opinion, that the sale ought to be vacated. It is un-
doubtedly one object of each decree for a sale, to obtain the best price that
can be obtained, consulting at the same time justice to all persons concerned,
and attending to their wishes as far as may be consistently with justice.
The Chancellor, as has been already intimated, passed the order for confir-
mation, merely because it appeared to be the wish of the only party entitled
to receive the net money arising from the sale. The circumstances since dis-
closed to him, make the case appear very different.

It seems that there are concerned several persons who have not given their
approbation, and it is doubtful whether the complainant is entitled to receive
any part of the money aforesaid. It is certain, that when Semple's Manor
was sold entire, a sale in that manner had not been announced before the
day of sale. It is most probable, that the trustees had not before that day
contemplated such a sale, and were determined by circumstances that then
took place. But if they then discovered that a sale in parcels, agreeably to
their advertisement, was impracticable, or would not be advantageous to the
persons who were to receive the money, it would have at least been prudent
for them to advertise, or give notice of a future day, when they would sell
the whole together, or divided into large parcels laid off by the surveyor. It
cannot be supposed, that any person went to the place of sale with an ex-
pectation of having the whole body of land set up. The Chancellor, how-
ever, thinks it his duty, in mere justice to the trustees, to declare, that in
his opinion there is no ground for concluding that they were guilty of
fraud, corruption, or undue combination, in making the sale. He believes
from a careful examination of all the proofs, that they acted according to
their judgment as faithful trustees; but he cannot for a moment doubt, that
their judgment was erroneous, even if the land hereafter should not com-
mand a higher price than they sold it for.

It is accordingly Ordered, that the sale made by Philip Barton Key and
William Marbury, of the aforesaid tract or body of land called "Keep
Trieste," or " Semple "s Manor," be, and it is hereby declared to be set aside,
vacated, and annulled.

The Chancellor, for the present, declines to pass any decree or order rela-
tive to another sale of the land; but he is anxious to make, without delay,
such arrangements as may do complete justice to every party concerned.
Let the counsel, if they think proper, agree upon another sale, to be pre-
scribed by a decree. He conceives that, notwithstanding the statement of
the report, the land may conveniently be laid off in parcels from one hun-
dred to one thousand acres: and that payment maybe as directed by the
original decree. That the land, if the legal title thereto be vested in the
State, ought to be sold, he thinks unquestionable. But, strange it is, that
persons having a claim superior to Lawson's should not come forward in a
regular proper manner. Should it appear that any person, not a party to
the suit, has a legal title to the land itself, assuredly it ought not to be sold.
MS.

39 2 B.