608 ANDREWS v. SCOTTON.—2 BLAND.

and also upon authority, as well in this State as in England, that
the Court of Chancery, and not its trustees, is in all cases to be

Semple's Manor shall be ratified; and that depositions of competent wit-
nesses, taken before a Judge or justice, shall be received as evidence on that
bearing of the cause. It is further Ordered, that in the mean time, if prac-
ticable, the auditor shall state the claim of the complainant, after giving
notice to the Attorney-General of the time and place of stating the same.

But the Chancellor wishes it to be understood, that no order he has passed
on the subject is founded on a conviction or opinion that the trustees have
violated their duty. The circumstances of the case, independent of the
objections against them, are such as in his opinion absolutely demand a
postponement.

After which this matter was again brought before the Court.

HANSON, C., 25th May, 1804.—-The Chancellor at length proceeds to a final
decision on the sale of the tract of land called "Keep Treiste," or " Semple's
Manor." Several appointments of days have been made for this purpose;
and he expected that every person who considered himself entitled to any
part of the land, or the money to arise from the sale, would come forward
in a regular and proper manner. He is disappointed; and he is to decide, as
well as he can, on such information as he has received.

He must first* remark, that on the day appointed for ratification nisi, &c.
it did not appear to him that any person whatever, who had either a legal
or an equitable interest, had made an objection to the sale reported by the
trustees; but it appeared to him, that the only person to be benefited by the
sale had, by his agent, given it his full approbation. He did not think it
becoming to postpone a ratification on account of the objections made by a
letter, from persons who did not state that they had either a legal or equit-
able interest in the land or money, and of whom many, by writing here
filed, had either disavowed or withdrawn their objections.

Under the circumstances of the case however, it might have been advis-
able for him to allow a further time for making or supporting objections.
The decree for the sale, as he intimated at the foot of it, was perhaps pre-
mature, although made on the written agreement of the complainant and
defendant. It might be premature, because it had not then, nor has it yet,
been ascertained whether any thing, or how much, was due to the complain-
ant.

With respect to sales under the authority of this Court, the Chancellor
thinks himself bound to act as if the property were his own, or held by him
in trust. That is to say, he thinks that reasons which would induce him, as
proprietor or trustee, to set aside a sale made by his agent, should determine
him as Chancellor, to refuse his approbation to a sale made by a trustee.
He has always availed himself of information, by whomsoever conveyed, in
deciding on the merits of the sale. Having, after he passed the order in
this case for ratification, received information respecting the interest in or
title to the land or money aforesaid, he considered himself at least justifiable
in rescinding the order and appointing a day, of which notice was to be
given, for deciding on the case.

He regrets the inconvenience which may have resulted from that order;
although he insisted that, as the case presented itself to him at the time of
passing the order, he could not do otherwise. He knew of no parties or
persons interested except James Lawson the complainant, or the defendants,