508 WATKINS v. WORTHINGTON.—2 BLAND.

Cord, 297; and yet, according to these principles, now under exami-
nation, in direct opposition to a rule of equity thus universally
sanctioned, it is assumed, even ex officio, as a fact, that the
creditor has been negligent; and that such his mere passive laches,
is a sufficient ground for refusing to allow him to obtain satisfac-
tion from the deceased's estate, unless he can prove, that the de-
ceased was the principal debtor, or that the other obligors are
insolvent.

Perhaps it may be supposed, that these principles of the Court
may derive some countenance from the equity upon which securi-
ties, or assets are marshalled; as where a creditor has his debt se-
cured by a lien or mortgage upon two funds, and another has au
interest in only one of the funds, he may compel the one whose
debt is secured by both, to resort to the other, so far as it may
be necessary, to satisfy both claims. 1 Mud. Chan. 250.

Aud where there are two different sets of parties, and one
set may resort to both funds, and the other only to one, the party
who may have recourse to both, may be compelled to resort to the
one fund, which cannot be reached by the other, so as to leave
enough for both. 1 Mad. Chan. 615.

This equity is, however, never administered ex officio, nor at the
suit of the debtor, but only at the instance of one creditor against
another; by which the debtor may nevertheless, indirectly derive
benefit. But the securities or assets can never be marshalled to
the prejudice of the creditor; or so as to suspend or put in peril
his claim; or upon any other terms than giving him entire satis-
faction. For in making this arrangement, the Court cannot lessen
his security or vary his contract; except so far as waiting a short
time to ascertain the value of the estates, can be considered as
having that effect. The creditor who calls for it, must shew that
the right of his co-creditor will neither be endangered nor inju-
riously delayed; for if he i'ails to do so, he can have no other
benefit than a subrogation of his right, or the being allowed to
stand in his place.

Hence it is evident, that these principles! of the Court, can
derive no support from the doctrine of marshalling securities or
assets.

* Some suggestions in favor of these principles may,
533 perhaps, be expected to be found in the rules by which
cases of bankruptcy are governed. A bankrupt, when contem-
plated as a really insolvent debtor, whose effects are about to be
distributed among his creditors, may be considered as presenting
a state of things strikingly analogous to that of a deceased debtor,
whose estate is to be applied in satisfaction of his debts, in due
course of administration.

It is a rule of equity, in cases of bankruptcy, deduced from the
general principles of the statutes by which the subject is regulated,