WATKINS v. WORTHINGTON.—2 BLAND. 507

surety had precisely the same right the creditor had, and must be
allowed to take his place in all respects; and also upon the prin-
ciple that the creditor is a trustee of his security, that is, of the
bond, suit, execution, &c. for all parties interested in it, or who
may ultimately resort to it for relief. Parsons v. Briddock, 2 Vern.
608; Nisbet v. Smith, 2 Bro. C. C. 571; Rees v. Berrington, 2 Ves.
Jun. 540; Wright v. Morley, 11 Ves. 22: Boultbee v. Stubbs, 18 Ves.
20; Samuell v. Howarth, 3 Meriv. 272; Robimon v. Wilaan, 2 Mad.
Rep. 434; Mayhew v. Crickett, 2 Swan. 190; Gould v. Robson, 8
East, 576; Clarke v. Devlin, 3 Bos. & Pul. 363; Hill v. Bull, Gil-
mer, 149; Bennett v. Maule, Gilmer, 305; Ward v. Johnson, 6 Mun.
6; Hollingsworth v. Floyd, 2 H. & G. 90. And so, too, if the
creditor omits to do that which the nature of his contract re-
quires him to do, as if. being the holder of a negotiable instrument,
he fails to give notice of its non-payment to the drawer and endor-
sers, they as sureties, will be completely discharged. Ex parte
Smith, 3 Bro. C. C. 1; Walwyn v. St. Quintin, 1 Box. & Pul. 652;
English v. Darley, 2 Bos. &; Pul. 61; Lennox v. Prout, 3 Wheat. 520.

The sole ground of relief to a surety, as exemplified by these
various instances at law and in equity, is, that he has, by the act
or omission of the creditor, been deprived of a legal or equitable
remedy for relieving himself, or that such remedy has been im-
paired. Buchanan v. Bordlcy, 4 H. & McH. 41; Norris v. Crummey,
2 Rand. 323; Hampton v. Levy, 1 McCord, 107: Galphin v. Mc-
Kinney, 1 McCord, 280. But it is distinctly avowed, that the
principles under consideration, are not founded on any such acts
or omissions of the creditor; but simply on a presumption of the
truth of certain facts, from which mere passive negligence is in-
ferred, and which maybe applied alike, and with equal propriety,
to all contracts to which there is, in fact, a principal and surety.
And consequently, they can derive no support from anything to be
found in this branch of the doctrine upon the subject of principal
and surety.

A creditor, however, is riot bound to active diligence against
the principal debtor; the surety is a guarantee; and it is his busi
ness to see that the principal pays, and not the creditor's; and
therefore, mere passive delay has never been held to discharge the
surety. This principle, in relation to the liability of a surety,
seems to have received the unqualified approbation, not only of
the Court of Appeals of this State; but of every other enlightened
* tribunal by whom the subject has been considered; Heath
v. Pereival,1 P. Will. 682; Wright v. Simpson, 6 Ves. 735; 532
Samuell v. Howarth. 3 Meriv. 272; The Trent Navigation Company
v. Harley, 10 East, 34; Iteming v. Norton, Kirby Rep. 397; King v.
Baldwin, 17 John. 384; The Commonwealth v. Wolbert, 6 Binn. 293;
Buchanan v. Bordley, 4 H. & McH. 41; Croughton v. Duval, 3 Call.
70; Hampton v. Levy, 1 McCord, 107; Galphin v. McKinney, 1 Mc-