272 CONTEE v. DAWSON.—2 BLAND.

designates these legatees as the children of her granddaughter
Margaret B. Clerk, wife of James Clerk, of Maryland; and with
this full knowledge of all circumstances, the testatrix gave this
legacy, and directed the trustee " to invest the same in their or
his names or name in the public stocks or funds, or at interest
upon parliamentary, government or real securities."

This specific direction as to the disposition to be made of this
legacy, it is evident, was given with a view, that it might be, with-
out delay, made productive, and placed in the greatest possible
security, to await the remote events which it was declared should
happen before it should be wholly paid over. The trustees were
allowed a very limited range of discretion as to the species of in-
vestment in England, and no where else. And it manifestly ap-
pears to have been the intention of the testatrix, that when the
investment had once been made it should remain, without exposing
the legacy to any new risk by any change whatever: or if any un-
forseen circumstance should render a new investment necessary,
that it should be made in some one or other of the specified Eng-
lish securities; and certainly not in any foreign funds, stocks, or
securities whatever. Hancom v. Alien, 2 Dick. 498; Howe v. Earl
of Dartmouth. 1 Ves. 137; Hill v. Simpson, 7 Ves. 152; Holland v.
Hughes, 16 Ves. 113; Ram. on Assets, 517.

Hence, I feel perfectly satisfied, that the sale made by the sur-
viving trustee William Dawson, of the stocks in which this legacy
had been invested, and the transfer of the proceeds from England
to Maryland was a most palpable and gross violation of the trust
reposed in him; and that he must be held strictly accountable for
* all the consequences thereof; unless he, or at this time,
290 his executrix, can show that he was induced to make the
sale and transfer by the cestuis que trust, who were then competent
to recommend and to sanction the transaction.

The interest of the cestui que trust, Margaret E. Clerklee, ex-
tended only to the profits and dividends of the invested legacy
during her life, to dispose of as a feme sole; and therefore, as it
has been proved, that she advised and required the change to be
made, she might have been bound to submit to any loss sustained
by reason of the transfer. But the consent of her children to the
sale, which has been so much relied on, was given, if at all, during
her life-time; and consequently, before any interest whatever had
vested in them. The direction of the legacy toward them was, at
that time, a mere possibility; they might, none of them, have sur-
vived their mother; and if they had, still they might, all of them,
have died before they became entitled to take; in which case tue
legacy went over to John Clerk. The children of Margaret R.
Clerklee during her life, were the mere apparent, but by no means
the actual cestuis que trust of this legacy. And having nothing
more than a possibility or expectancy, without even the shadow of