CONTEE v. DAWSON.—2 BLAND. 271

must have been then married; or thirdly, she must after the death
of her mother have been married; or fourthly, after that event she
must have lived to attain the age of twenty-one years. Upon the
happening of any of these circumstances an interest in a due pro-
portion of this legacy vested in each daughter so qualified, as a
tenant in common, with her other sisters, who should, in like man-
ner, then be or thereafter become entitled to a share.

The legacy is directed to be equally divided among all, if all
should become so qualified to take. Hence, on the death of the
mother, leaving six daughters, it became liable, upon the happen-
ing of the specified contingencies, to be divided into six equal parts;
each one of which could only vest as each daughter, who then was,
or thereafter became qualified to take. But as, upon the death of
any one of the six daughters before she became entitled to take,
her share would fall in for the benefit of the rest; or in other words,
the whole legacy would not, in such case, be divided into so many
as six parts; the number of shares into which it must ultimately
be divided cannot be finally determined until it shall have been
ascertained, whether or not any have died without having been
qualified to take, after the youngest of them shall have been mar
ried, or shall have attained the age of twenty-one years. Before
the institution of this suit, on or after the death of the mother,
three parts of this legacy became vested in those of her daughters
who were then or thereafter of full age or married; and one other
part, alter the tiling of this bill, became vested in the defendant
Elizabeth Clerk lee, who attained her full age. And, consequently,
the. two remaining parts must await the event of the marriage, or
coming of age of the two now unmarried infant daughters; until
the happening of one or the other of which contingencies, or the
death of either or both of those infants previous thereto, they first,
and next their sisters, have an expectant interest in those two
parts of this legacy, to meet the happening of which event the
amount of those shares must be still retained in trust.

But it has been contended, that this legacy has been transferred
* to this country, and lost without the default of the trustee,
and therefore, that these plaintiffs cannot recover any thing, 289
or certainly no more than a proportion of what has been saved, and
is now in the hands of his executrix the defendant Eleanor Dawsoti;
since it has been expressly declared by the testatrix Ann Russell,
that "they, the trustees, shall not be answerable or accountable for
any misfortune, loss, or damage whatever, that may happen to the
said trust moneys, or premises, or any part or parts thereof, unless
the same shall happen by or through their or his gross and wilful
neglect or default respectively."

It is distinctly shown by the codicil to this will, and so admitted
that the testatrix Ann Russell made her will with a full knowledge
of the situation and legal capacities of all her legatees. She