CONTEE v. DAWSON.—2 BLAKD. 253

pertinent facts, out of which legal or equitable principles may

* arise, not any mere matter of opinion or idle assertion. In
the case before alluded to, McKim v. Thompson, I Bland, 268
155, the party alleged; first, the validity of the deed; second, the
receipt of the money under the deed; and third, that the intention
of the deed was that he should hold the money so received. The
two first of those allegations stated and admitted the truth of the
facts upon which the judgment of the Court was founded; and the
third amounted to no more than an expression of the defendant's
opinion of the intention of the deed, which being erroneous, was
therefore passed over unnoticed. But, although parties may be
indulged in a brief expression of their opinions as to the law arising
out of the facts they set forth, and the doing so may in many cases
be received as a useful indication of the objects they aim at, yet
there is no absolute necessity, in any case, to make any statement
or allegation as to the legal consequences of any facts, since it is
the peculiar and exclusive duty of the Court to pronounce what is
the law arising out of any combination of tacts which may be reg-
ularly brought before it. In this case, and at present, all the alle-
gations of fact contained in the answer of Eleanor Dawson, must
be taken to be true, as well those which are immediately respon-
sive to the bill, as those which introduce new facts by way of
avoidance and defence.

The petitioners, however, assuming a view of the answer, in re-
lation to the matter now under consideration, which they assert is
the correct one, contend, that all the admitted facts necessary to
lay a proper foundation for the desired order, are to be found in
the answer of Eleanor Dawson. except those set forth in the ac-
count settled by her with the Orphans' Court, a copy of which is
exhibited as a part of their petition. And that account, they urge,
Is now admissible as part of the foundation of the proposed order,
as being analogous to a confirmed auditor's report, and as proof of
collateral facts within the meaning of this Court's opinion in the
case alluded to. McKim \. Thompson, 1 Bland, 155. Therefore,
if that account should not be deemed admissible for that purpose,
there is, even by the petitioner's own concession, no just ground
for his application, and it will be unnecessary to notice any other
matter in relation to it.

The confirmation of an auditor's report is, in every sense, a judg-
ment of the Court. For although it may not constitute a part of
the final judgment on the whole case, it is nevertheless always
considered as a judgment conclusive of the matter which it affirms

* and to which it relates, with some exceptions, subject only
to be reheard or revised for similar causes, which would in- 269
duce the Court to rehear or revise any other of its judgments. It
has been deemed a sufficient foundation for an order to bring
money into Court; because it was so conclusive as to the matter