252 CONTEE v. DAWSON.— 2 BLAND.

any of the English eases, but in what particular is not perceived.
The English eases are grounded upon an interest in the plaintiff,
and an admission in the answer itself, or an admission by reference
to a schedule, or to books or documents; or upon an auditor's re-
port confirmed; because the confirmation of such a report is a
judgment of the Court. In the late case in this Court, the admis-
sion was accompanied by a reference to a deed, the construction
of which belonged to the Court, * and which was found to be
267 unambiguous, and to leave no room for the introduction of
proof as to its true intent and meaning.

It is a general rule, that a plaintiff may at any time, without or
by withdrawing his general replication, set the case down for final
hearing on bill and answer. But if he does so, he thereby neces-
sarily admits the truth of all the facts set forth in the answer, as
well those stated as directly responsive to the bill, as all those new
facts and circumstances, pertinent to the matter in controversy,
which have been introduced into it by way of avoidance, or as a
defence. The reason and utility of this rule are obvious. The
plaintiff cannot be permitted to deprive the defendant of the means
of sustaining his defence by proof; but if he admits the truth of all
the facts alleged by way of defence in the defendant's answer, he
does not do so. Because a defendant cannot be expected or al-
lowed to make his defence stronger, or better than he himself has
stated it, and therefore if the plaintiff admits the truth of all those
facts set forth as constituting that defence, the defendant can have
no cause to complain, nor any pretext for asking to be indulged
with any further delay to the prejudice of the plaintiff, since the
collecting of proofs in such case must be altogether unnecessary.
Grosvenor v. Cartwright, 2 Ca. Chan. 21; Barker v. Wyld, 1
Vern. 140; Wrottesley v. Bendish, S P. Will. 237. note; Leyard
v. Sheffield, 2 A1k. 377; Wright v. Nutt, 3 Bro. C. C. 339; Beam's
Orders, 20, 180; 2 Er. Pothier Ob. 137.

So, in cases of this kind, where the order is proposed to be
grounded on the admissions of the defendant. The truth of all
the facts alleged in the answer must necessarily be conceded, be-
cause the defendant cannot have his answer garbled, or be de-
prived of the means of sustaining his defence by proof, if the facts
alleged by him are denied; and because it is only by the plaintiffs'
granting the truth of the facts alleged by way of defence, that it
is rendered wholly unnecessary to adduce proof, and the case be-
comes so situated as to be susceptible of being fairly and at once
presented to the Court, upon facts not liable to be contradicted or
explained away at the hearing.

From some expression which fell from the counsel in the course
of the argument, I deem it proper, however, to remark, that in de-
claring that all the allegations of the defendant's answer, in cases
of this sort, must be taken to be true, I mean the allegations of