THE RAILROAD v. HOYE.—2 BLAND. 247

the erroneous survey of Clara Fisher; because that location is in

* general terms, and might have been fairly and properly

intended to embrace the same vacancy, without any knowl- 263

edge, at that time, of the survey of it under the name of Clara
Fisher. And, besides, if the location of River's Bend, made in
the surveyor's book, corresponds fully with the survey of it, then
the survey is such a following up of the right of pre-emption ac-
quired by the location as will give date, to the perfected legal
title, by relation, from the date of the location in the surveyor's
book; but if it does not so correspond, and there should be found
any essential discordance between the location in the surveyor's
book, and the actual survey, then the perfected legal title of
River's Bend, can only be carried back to the 5th of June, the
date of the actual survey, and not to the 28th of May, the date of
the location. Cunningham v. Browning, 1 Bland, 311, 325. There
is, therefore, room to doubt, whether the claimant of River's Bend
made the location in the surveyor's book with a full knowledge of
the previous erroneous survey of Clara Fisher; and also whether
the survey does, in fact, essentially conform to the special location
made in the surveyor's book.

The decision of the Chancellor on a caveat in the land office is
final, without appeal; and therefore, it has been the practice, in

all cases of just doubt as to facts, or where a matter of much im-
portance or difficulty presents itself, which can be left open after a
patent shall have been issued, to permit each party to perfect his
legal title, so as to allow the matter to be brought either before
the Court of Chancery by a scire facias, or information to vacate
the patent, or before a Court of common law in an action of eject-
ment, or otherwise; and thus give to the parties the benefit of a
more full and satisfactory investigation, and a final decision by the
Court of Appeals in some one or other of those modes; and so
virtually and in effect allowing them the benefit of an appeal as in
ordinary cases. Johnson v. Hawn, Land Hoi. Ass. 417. For these
reasons I shall allow each of these parties to obtain a patent.

Whereupon it is adjudged and ordered, that each of the caveats
before mentioned, be and the same is hereby dismissed; each party
to pay his own costs.

dismissed; that the said defendant William Biggs, be also hence dismissed;
and that the said Richard and James Winchester do pay unto him the costs,
by him sustained, in the defence of their suit against him, amounting, as
taxed by the register of this Court, to the quantity of three thousand eight
hundred and seven pounds of tobacco.