WINDER v. DIFFENDERFER.—2 BLAND. 187

had paid the whole purchase money, to have the benefit of the
equitable lien of the vendor, (n) and also to allow a .surety in a

(n) MELUY v. COOPER.—This bill was filed on the 7th of December, 1803;
it states that a mill, &c. the property of James Tilghman, had been sold
under a decree of this Court, by Hugh Sherwood, as trustee; that James
Cooper became the purchaser, who agreed to receive the plaintiff, Meluy, as
a joint purchaser with him of the one-half; each to pay one-half of the pur-
chase money: that Cooper took possession and died, without having paid
any part of the purchase money; that the whole purchase money had been
since paid by the plaintiff, but no deed had been obtained from the trustee,
Sherwood: and that the plaintiff has a lien on Cooper's half for the purchase
money, which he. the plaintiff, became bound as surety to pay. and had in
fact paid. Prayer, that the mill. &c. might be sold to reimburse the plain-
tiff. &c.

On the 12th of February. 1804, the infant heirs of James Cooper answered
by their guardian ad litem: and the trustee, Sherwood, also put in his
answer, by which they admitted the truth of the allegations of the bill.
Upon which the case was submitted: and on the 13th of February, 1804, a
decree was passed that the property be sold, &c. After which the infant
defendants, by William Atkinson, their guardian, petitioned that the decree
might be opened, and that they might have leave to amend their answer.

HANSON, C., 1st March, 1804.—Not even an affidavit of the truth of the
matters stated in, or annexed to the petition. The Chancellor, therefore,
cannot at present comply with the prayer of the petition.

On the 3d of April, 1804. a similar petition, with an affidavit of the truth
annexed, was filed; and the plaintiff, Meluy, afterwards filed a counter
petition, upon which the case was again submitted.

HANSON, C., 1st May, 1804.—The Chancellor has considered the said peti-
tions. The former, although intended to prevent the execution of a decree,
is neither an application for rehearing a cause, nor a bill of review. It is a
request that a decree may be opened, and that another answer may be ad-
mitted, and fresh proceedings be had. In fact it was an application to set
aside a decree, regularly passed on the bill, answers, and proof, without
suggesting any error in judgment, or discovery of facts; and that, too, is
expected to be done without hearing the other party or calling on him to .
answer. A similar application the Chancellor does not recollect ever before
to have received or heard of. If it should succeed, the precedent thereby
established, might render decrees of little value indeed: as a defendant,
against whom a decree should be passed, might obtain an order for annul-
ling the proceedings; or, at least, infant defendants might have that advan-
tage.

When a decree is passed, the parties are no longer in Court. Suppose the
Chancellor to pass an order for opening the decree, as is prayed, what are to
be the subsequent proceedings? It may be said, the Chancellor is to act
according to his discretion, to prescribe the time for putting in an answer
by another guardian, &c. &c. But under what law, usage, or practice,
should he act? On a bill of review, permitted to be filed, or an order for
rehearing, the practice is established. But the present application, as has
already been observed, is neither a bill of review nor a petition for rehear-
ing. In a word, it appears wholly unprecedented, as well as improper.