186 WINDER v. DIFFENDERFFER.—2 BLAND.

first, the claims and pretensions of the representatives of the late
Catherine; ami second, the liabilities of and allowances to this de-
fendant, John Diffenderffer.

It has been urged, that the debts of the late Charles Rogers
were paid, contrary to the directions of his will, by the trustee,
Vincent, out of rents and profits which ought to have gone to the
late Catherine; and, consequently, that she or her representatives,
to the extent of the rents and proiits to which she was entitled,
and which had been so misapplied, ought now to lie allowed to
take the place of those creditors as against these funds in the
hands of this trustee, and which are now about to be distributed.

This stand is taken upon the ground of substitution; and it can
only be maintained by means of those principles by which a surety,
or one who has been placed in the condition of a surety is allowed
to take the place of the creditor against the principal debtor; or
by the help of those principles by winch securities or assets
199 are * marshalled so as to satisfy all, or to leave the loss to
fall where it must rest according to the positive rules of law: or by
the aid of the general principles of equity arising out of some fraud
or injustice practised, or participated in by the plaintiffs, or those
under whom they claim.

It is a well settled general rule, that no one can be allowed to
intrude himself upon another as his surety; and therefore if a man
voluntarily pays the debt of another, without any agreement to
that effect with the debtor, he cannot take the place of the credi-
tor, or in any way recover the money so paid of the debtor; because
the law does not permit one man thus, officiously, and without so-
licitation, to intermeddle with the affairs of another. Stokes v.
Lewis, 1 T. R. 20. The only exception to this general rule is,
where, on a bill of exchange being dishonored, a third person, not
a party to it, may pay it for the honor of the drawer, or any of the
endorsers. The reason of allowing this exception is, that it induces
the friends of the drawer or endorsers to render them this service;
and by that means preserves the honor of commerce, and the credit
of the trader. Chitty on Bills, 164. But where one, by express
contract, becomes bound as a surety for the payment of the debt
of another, or as an insurer against loss, then if the surety or in-
surer pays the whole debt, or reimburses the loser, he thereby in-
titles himself to demand a full assignment or subrogation of all the
securities of the creditor or insured, and has aright, in all respects,
to be substituted for the creditor or insured, so as to enable him
to obtain re-imbnrsement from his principal. Randal v. Cockran,
1 Ves. 98; Ex parte Rushforth, 10 Ves. 414; Pothier Obli. p. 2, c.
6, art. 4: Just. Inst. by Cooper, 612.

This general right of a surety has, to a certain extent, been af-
firmed by an Act of Assembly, 1763, ch;. 23, a. 8, and this Court
has so entirely approved of the doctrine as to allow a surety, who