BINNEY'S CASE.—2 BLAND. 141

this Act of incorporation, * as to the- terminations of the
great line of canal navigation, which it was the design of 150
this law to cause to be constructed. The Court cannot think, that
this Act of incorporation is so very obscure as it has been said to
be, in relation to the terminations of the projected canal. But,
allowing it to be so, to a considerable degree, it will be fit and
proper, after so much argument has been bestowed upon the sub-
ject, to say something as to the extent and nature of the external
help, that may be called in upon this occasion.

No verbal proof can be admitted to explain a written contract,
much less should it be allowed to introduce such testimony to shew
what was the true meaning of an Act of the Legislature. If the
language used be absolutely contradictory and absurd, the law can-
not be carried into execution, and the design of the Legislature,
however well known it may be from inference or other circumstan-
ces, not having been expressed, must altogether fail. 1 Blue. Com.
91. A latent ambiguity is one which is not apparent upon the in-
strument inself; but becomes so by applying it to the subject to
which it relates; as, if it disposes of a tract of land by name, and
the maker of the instrument has two tracts of the same name; in
such case proof is allowed to shew which of the two was meant.
But this Act of incorporation is not charged with being ambigu-
ous in this sense; nor is it alleged, that its otherwise clear phrase-
ology has been in any manner thrown into doubt and confusion by
any exhibition of the facts, circumstances, and things to which it
relates; on the contrary, those great objects, the rivers, and the
mountains of which it speaks, now as when it was passed, had
their existence in nature on the surface of the country, unchanged
and unchangeable; and therefore, a latent ambiguity, in any legal
sense of that expression, cannot be shewn to exist by any proof
whatever.

The Act provides for the making of a " navigable canal from the
tide-water of the River Potomac." And the question arising out
of this expression is, as to where the canal shall begin. Hence it
is obvious, that the proof of facts and circumstances of any kind,
as evidence of what was really intended to be the point of begin-
ning thus described, can only be allowed on the ground, that it is
admissible thus to assist in the interpretation of expressions which
are doubtful upon their face, and so to aid the Court in making out
the sense of the Legislature by other means than the language
used, *when taken iu connexion with the known established
nature of the subject of which that language treats. 151

Private Acts of Assembly are, in a great variety of cases, and in
many respects, regarded as mere contracts, binding alone on those
who apply for and are parties to them. As to such Acts, and
ancient charters, there are some kinds of doubts and obscurities
which may be removed and dispelled by extrinsic evidence. Where