140 BINNEY'S CASE.—2 BLAND.

of Virginia; consequently, to that extent each State must have an
exclusive jurisdiction, so far as it may be necessary to prevent its
erection by injunction. But the object of preventing the erection
of this dam is to put a stop to the expenditure of the funds of the
body politic, for other than corporate purposes, within the District
of Columbia; and consequently, so far only as the body politic
* may be restrained, by injunction, from making such illegal
149 expenditures anywhere, the Courts of justice of each govern-
ment must be allowed to have equal and concurrent jurisdiction.
Under the articles of union between England and Scotland, it is ad-
mitted that there may be cases in which it would be difficult or im-
possible to do justice, unless the Courts of the several States gave
aid to each other; and so co-operated within their respective jurisdic-
tions, from which all other judicial power is excluded, as to render
the judgments of the tribunals of each State effectual within their
proper spheres. Kennedy v. Cassillis, 2 Swan. 322. So in this coun-
try, under the limited nature of our Federal Union, it is perfectly
obvious, that, in cases of this kind, without a proper degree of
comity and mutual aid, evils may arise from the conflicting adjudi-
cations of the separate, co-ordinate and independent Courts, which
must be allowed to take cognizance of such matters; because of
there being no common tribunal, in the last resort, by which their
different determinations may be harmonized. Yet, such an
exercise of jurisdiction, with all its probable evils, must of necessity
be allowed, since there would, otherwise, be a total failure of
justice. The Charitable Corporation v. Sutton, 2 Atk. 406; S. C. 9
Mod. 356; Barnesly v. Powel, 1 Ves. 287; Coysgarne v. Jones, Amb.
613. For these reasons, the defendant's objection to the jurisdic-
tion of this Court, as relates to its power to inquire into the pro-
priety of expenditures within the District of Columbia, may be
entirely put aside.

Supposing that they might fail of making good their two first
grounds of defence, these defendants have presented a third, upon
which they mainly rely. They insist, that they are fully author-
ized to extend their works, as projected, within the District of
Columbia; that, this dam, being necessary and proper for that
legitimate purpose, may well be erected under that authority; and
that they ought not to be judicially prevented from erecting it
accordingly.

The parties, in relation to this point, ranging far a field in ver-
bal criticism, and taking it for granted, that the Act of incorpora-
tion was so excessively ambiguous, as to require all manner of
assistance to reach its meaning, have carefully gathered up almost
all the sayings and doings of the originators, advocates, and med-
dlers in what they have called,'' the great enterprise, "and adduced
them to shew what is, what was intended to be, and what this
Court should pronounce to be the true intent, and meaning of