BINNEY'S CASE.—2 BLAND. 137

livered up and cancelled; or in specific performance of a contract
for land in another State, such a conveyance may be ordered as
shall be sufficient according to the law of the State were it lies.
But the Court will not decree a partition of such land, or in any
manner directly decide upon the title to it, or upon the validity of
a deed or will as a material part of the title; nor found the relief
granted upon the strict title to such property itself. Cartwright v.
Pettus, 2 Co,. Chan. 214; Arglasse v. Muschamp, 1 Vern. 75; Kildare
v. Eustace, 1 Vern. 419; Toller v. Carteret, 2 Vern. 494; Fryer v.
Bernard, 2 P. Will. 261: Derby v. Athol, 1 Ves. 203; Perm v. Lord
Baltimore, 1 Ves. 444; Roberdeau v. Rous, 1 Aik. 544; Foster v.
Vassall, 3 Aik. 589; Ex parte Marchioness of Annandale, Amb. 80;
Pike v. Hoare, Amb. 428; 8. C. 2 Eden, 182; Cranstoicnv. Johnxton,
3 Ves. 170; In the matter of the Duchess of Chandois, 1 Scho. and
Lefr. 301; Lord dive's Jaghire, 1 Coll. Jurid. 181; Massie v. Watts,
6 Craw. 158; Guerrant v. Fowler, 1 Hen, and Mun. 4.

The whole estate of The Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company,
at least so far as it consists of the canal itself, and its necessary
buildings, and the fixtures attached to them, mast, according to
the common law, be regarded as realty; Co. Litt. 19, 6; Dry-
butter v. Bartholomew, 2 P. Will. 127; Buckeridge v. Ingram, 2 Ves.
Jun. 652; Ram. on Assets, 184; and it was so considered * by
the original Act of incorporation; but by a subsequent 146
enactment, it has been declared, that it should be deemed personal
property. 1827, ch. 61. The right to land is, and necessarily
must, be regulated by the law of the government under which it is
situated. Mere movables are generally allowed, by the comity of
nations, to be disposed of according to the law of the place of the
owner's domicile. 1 Mad. Chan. 626; Kam. Pri. Eq. b. 3, c. 8, s. 3;
Dixon v. Ramsay, 3 Cran. 319; De Sobry v. De Laistre, 2 H. & J.
224. The reason why land must be governed by the law of the
country where it lies, does not arise, in any manner, from our
common law distinction between real and personal property; but,
from the principles of international law, which regards land as a
portion of the habitation of the nation; and which, from its fixed
and immovable nature as such, must, of necessity, be absolutely
and altogether regulated by the nation to whom it belongs. And
therefore, a conveyance or will of land, a mortgage or a contract
concerning such as canal stock must all be sued upon in Maryland,
and the local nature of the thing requires them to be carried into
execution here. Vattel, b. 2, s. 83; Kam. Pri. Eq. b. 3, c. 8, s. 2;
Lord Clive's Jaghire, 1 Coll Jun. 188; Bligh v. Darnley, 2 P. Will.
622; Calvin's Case, 1 Go. 36; Robinson v. Bland, 2 Burr. 1079;
The King v. The Dock Company of Hull, 1 T. R., 219; The
Commonwealth v. Martin, 5 Mun. 120; Ex parte Home, 14 Com. Law
Rep. 106. It would seem, however, that in a work of the kind
now under consideration, if tolls are appointed to be gathered at a