136 BINNEY'S CASE.—2 BLAND.

nature; yet as a body politic which stretches itself, in an unbroken
line, under the separate jurisdictions of several governments; hold-
ing and occupying portions of the territory of each; and as an
artificial being formed by an infusion of the spirit and power of all.
According to this constitution of its existence, it has received its
funds, makes all its expenditures, and must hold its estate. To
ascertain whether, in point of fact, any of the disbursements of this
body were for corporate purposes or not, it would seem to be pro-
per to dismiss from the inquiry every consideration as to the differ-
ent sources from which it deduced its existence; and simply to
determine, whether the authority to make the expenditure was
given by the Act of incorporation or not; taking it to be a law of
one single government only.

The question here presented, however, is not whether the
expenditure is for corporate purposes or not; but one preliminary
to that, which is, whether the determination of that question
belongs exclusively, or to what extent, to the judicial authority of
any one of the governments by which this single corporation has
been erected?

No Court of justice can act upon any controverted matter where
both the person and the thing are beyond its reach; and every tri-
bunal, not acting under the law of nations, has some local limits to
its jurisdiction; indeed those which have been charged with the
administration of justice, under our common law code, have a very-
special and peculiar reference and adaptation to the territorial
divisions of the State. Kame's Prin. Eq. b. 3,c. 7. But the juris-
diction of the High Court * of Chancery over the matters of
145 which it takes cognizance is co-extensive with the confines
of the State itself. According to its original constitution, it could
act upon the person only; but its powers have been, in many
respects, so enlarged as to enable it to act also upon the subject in
controversy; and it has been specially authorized to use the execu-
tive and coercive process of the common law. 1785, ch. 72, s. 23,
25. Thus braced and armed it possesses powers and means to
afford redress in almost every case, not exclusively belonging to
the Courts of common law, or in which they are so constituted as
to be able to give adequate relief. Wherever a person is to be
found within reach of the Court of Chancery, and he may, in any
respect, be considered as a trustee, or the matter in dispute arises
out of a transitory personal contract not, necessarily involving the
title to, and following land; and which the party may, by personal
coercion, he made to execute specifically, this Court may have
jurisdiction and decree accordingly. Therefore, if a defendant be

found here he may be decreed to pay money, or to account for the
rents and profits of lands lying in another, or a foreign country,
which he had held and enjoyed; or if a deed of lands in a foreign
country be found to be fraudulent, it may be ordered to be de-