STRIKE'S CASE.—1 BLAND. 83

* such proof as was admitted to sustain claims against de-
ceased persons' estates. But, if the insolvent denied the 91

just debts, would become inadequate, or the infants might be impoverished.
The Chancellor has never thought it necessary, or indeed proper, in the case
of any disputed claims against a deceased person, to send out an issue, or to
refer the party to an action at law. Indeed it would be difficult, in most
cases, to ascertain the proper parties for au issue. The executor or adminis-
trator surely would not be compelled, without being a party, to act as de-
fendant on the trial of the issue. However, in all cases where a claim de-
pends on a single fact, or facts, strongly litigated, and of difficult investiga-
tion, the Chancellor conceives, that in some manner an issue ought to be
tried. For instance, a bond is exhibited with an affidavit of no payment,
&c.; payment is alleged; but no receipt is produced: or if a receipt be pro-
duced, there is an allegation of forgery. In such a case, an issue may be
sent out to be tried between the claimant and the party alleging: if the said
party chooses to be considered as plaintiff on the trial of the issue.

In the present case, the claimant has filed an account with an affirmation
of the truth of the account. The person taking the affirmation has not
certified the affirmant to be a Quaker, Menonist, Tanker, Nicolite. or other
person, entitled by law to have his affirmation to be on a footing with an
affidavit by a common person. Of course, the affirmation is to stand for
nothing.

The petitioner, Benjamin Morgan, has supposed the objection to his claim
is. that his account is not regularly stated. He is mistaken. The objection
is, that he has no proofs or vouchers to establish any claim against the de-
ceased. He claims, as the representative of a partner with the deceased.
He charges the deceased with all goods sent to him. and gives no credit,
unless for remittances in money, or other things. The balance he considers
as the sum to him due; or if he and the deceased were partners, he considers
himself entitled to one-half of the balance. His account resembles little a
partnership account. A and B are partners. A sends £10.000 worth of
goods to B who remits to him £8,000. Can it be supposed, that merely from
this, B owes £2.000 to the partnership; and of course owes £1,000 to B?
No ! The charges of the store are to be taken into the account. There may
he losses of the articles, or they may have been sold for less than was ex-
pected : or they may have been sold for a great profit. In fact B was only
to credit the company with the sale of the articles, and to charge every ex-
pense of storekeeping; and if there was a balance in favor of the partner-
ship, that is to say. if, after deducting all expenses the sale of the goods
amounted to not more than £10.000, it is impossible that B shall be in debt
to A.

The claimant, Morgan, has, by his petition, requested the Chancellor, to
instruct the auditor with respect to the mode of stating the account. What
can the Chancellor do more, if he shall direct the auditor, than order him
to state the account, as other accounts are stated? The auditor's objection
to the account, was not merely as to the mode. The auditor was of opinion,
that an account charging the goods sent to Sluby, and crediting him only
with what he sent to Morgan, could not possibly be a just statement of a
partnership account.

Morgan, by his petition, requests an order for the production of books in
general. Perhaps the law, usage, or practice of this Court, respecting the
production of books, is less understood, in general, than any part of the
jurisdiction of this Court. The power of ordering books, has ever, as it