82 STRIKE'S CASE.—1 BLAND.

to consider the insolvent's schedule, or his voluntary admission, as
sufficient evidence of the debt; or if the insolvent was dead, then

same effect; and. on the 3d July. 1801, a decree was passed, ordering a sale
of the real estate in the usual form.

It appears that Benjamin E. Morgan, another creditor, came in by filing
the voucher of his claim, which the auditor, by his report of the 22d June.
1802, declared to be wholly inadmissible. After which. Morgan filed his
petition, praying, that the Chancellor would take the subject into his con-
sideration, and give such directions to the auditor, as he thought proper.
On the 25th November, 1802, Morgan, by petition, prayed for further time
to produce satisfactory proof of his claim; and the Chancellor appointed a
day for hearing, &c. On the 12th February, 1803, William Ringgold, and
also James Ringgold, two of the originally suing creditors, by petition, ob-
jected to the allowance of the claim of Morgan; because it was founded on
a partnership transaction, which had been settled: and that the claim had
been paid; and OB the 30th of April following, one of them. James Eing-
gold, filed sundry objections to Morgan's claim, the first of which is thus
expressed: "That the same is for a balance stated to be due on a partnership
between the said parties, ending in the year 1774, which ought not to be
allowed, on account of the lapse of time, and being unsettled by the parties
themselves, is exhibited by the executor. [B. R. Morgan.] of one partner
against the real estate of the other, where the creditors of Sluby have no
opportunity, by producing his books, to invalidate the same."

HANSON, C.. 3d May. 1803.—Benjamin Morgan having exhibited a claim
against the said Sluby"s estate, which the auditor of this Court rejected, the
Chancellor, on application of one of the said Sluby's creditors, passed an
order, declaring, that on the 24th of Api il last, he would, on application,
decide on the said claim, provided notice. &c. &c. Notice has been acknow-
ledged by Morgan's solicitor, who appearing, here produces no proof or
voucher, to establish the claim heretofore made, but prays further time, and
instructions from the Chancellor; and an order for the producing of books.
&c.

It is certain, that at the time of passing the last order for deciding, &c..
it was the Chancellor's intent, and it was so understood, as it seems, by the
said solicitor, and the creditor, that the aforesaid claim should, at the time
appointed, be decided on, and the applicant aforesaid unite in the decision's
taking place.

The Act of 1785, ch. 72, has been always understood, as directing the lands
of a deceased debtor, who devises, or suffers his real estate to descend to an
infant or infants, to be sold under the authority of this Court, in aid of the
defective personal estate, to pay the debts of the deceased which are estab-
lished to the Chancellor's satisfaction. No mode is prescribed by the Act for
establishing the debts. It is left entirely to the Chancellor's discretion; but
he has observed, it is a rule to admit claims on such proof as is prescribed
for, and is satisfactory to an Orphans' Court, and even to admit claims,
passed against an executor or administrator, by an Orphans" Court, unless
objected to by some person interested, viz: by a creditor of the deceased, or
his executor or administrator, or by the guardian of the infants.

When claims are objected to on one part, and persisted in on the other
part, the question is, in what manner shall it be tried? If every disputed
claim should be directed to be tried by a jury, very considerable expense
might, in many instances, be incurred; and the fund, for the payment of