THE CHANCELLOR'S CASE.—1 BLAND. 629

sion. This, the Constitution has declared, shall not be directly
and purposely done by the General Assembly; and surely, what is
prohibited, and, therefore, cannot be directly done, can never be
accomplished by any contrivance or indirect movement; and it
would be hopeless to attempt to maintain, that what cannot be

* constitutionally effected by the whole General Assembly,
may nevertheless be fairly brought about by either the 672
Senate, or the House of Delegates alone.
There is a consistency and a harmony in our Constitution, which

-can, in no respect, be disturbed without being productive of some
pernicious consequences. The several parts, and the whole to-
gether, have been, and are still further susceptible of being
amended, improved, and re-invigorated; but, the collision of one
part against another, has never failed to be attended with the
most serious mischief. The breaking of a single chord produces
the harshest dissonance throughout. The Declaration of Rights
declares, "that the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of
government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each
other." This division and separation is the peculiar characteristic
and great excellence of our Government. It is the grand bulwark
of all our rights, and every citizen has the deepest interest in its most
sacred preservation. Each of these several departments should
be kept, and should feel it to be its highest honor, to keep strictly
within the constitutional boundaries assigned to it. The Legisla-
ture should not encroach upon the judiciary, nor upon the Execu-
tive; nor should either of those departments trench upon each
other, or upon the legislative.

Commissions during good behavior, and salaries secured during
the continuance of those commissions, constitute that strong well
marked boundary between the judiciary and the other two depart-
ments. Thus founded and sustained, the Judges are, and can be—
and without it they cannot be—a firm, efficient, co-ordinate check
and balance in the government. It is this independency of char-
acter, that enables the judiciary to shield the citizen against un-
constitutional legislation; and against unwarranted wrong and
violence from the wealthy and the influential.

But, it would be a mockery to expect of Judges who are de-
pendent upon legislators for their continuance in office, perhaps
for their bread, a firmness and independency necessary for such
purposes. No Judge, thus dependent, would have the boldness to
thwart a House of Delegates in their most ill-advised and wanton
sports with the Constitution. The sage declaration of the patriots
of 1776, " That all persons invested with the legislative or execu-
tive powers of government are the trustees of the public, and as
such accountable for their conduct," would be smothered or for-
gotten. The Senators would not dare to consider themselves as a