628 THE CHANCELLOR'S CASE,—1 BLAND.

the understanding and belief of either branch of the Assembly,
that the Act of 1792 was a permanent Act, one which could not be
constitutionally repealed, during the continuance of the Chan-
cellor's commission; and, that the Act of 1798 was altogether
temporary in its character, and might therefore be suffered to
expire. But, let it be conceded, that such was the understanding
of the delegates. If this position is correctly understood, it
amounts to no more than this: Where a salary is given to the
Chancellor by a law, which is not limited in duration, it cannot
be constitutionally repealed for the purpose of diminishing that
salary. If this be the position claimed by the delegates, every
*thing for which the Chancellor and Senate contend, is
671 admitted. But it seems, there is a nice distinction between
the repealing of a law, and the suffering of a law to expire. What
is it? Does it amount to anything more than a distinction be-
tween an act of commission, and an act of omission ? The law,
having declared the amount of the Chancellor's salary, the Legis-
lature cannot constitutionally dimmish it by repealing that law;
but they may do so by suffering it to expire:—that is, the Legisla-
ture commit a violation of the Constitution, if they do pass an Act
to diminish the salary; but if they diminish it by omitting to pass
an Act, they do not violate the Constitution. This opinion, then,
can have no other foundation, than the distinction between an act
of commission and omission. Let us examine it.

The great object of the Constitution is judicial independency;
and, therefore, it is commanded by the Declaration of Bights, that
the Chancellor's salary shall be secured to him during the con-
tinuance of his commission. The mode of obeying this command
is a matter of no importance; and therefore, the mode is submitted
entirely to the discretion of the Legislature. But any act, either
of commission or of omission, which disobeys this command,
and which prevents the attainment of the object contemplated, is
alike a violation of the Constitution. Suppose the Legislature
should, by an Act, without making any provision whatever for
payment, fix the amount of the salary of the Chancellor; and
then, by another Act, provide a fund for its payment; and, after-
wards, were to repeal the latter Act, without making any other
provision for payment. It is presumed, that no one could hesitate
in pronouncing such conduct a gross violation of the Constitution.
Then suppose, the Act, making provision for payment, were limited
to two years; and the Assembly were to neglect to continue it, or
to make any other provision for payment; such legislative omis-
sion, would have precisely the same effect as the act of commis-
sion; and, therefore, the violation of the Constitution would be no
less palpable. The salary of the Chancellor is to be secured to
him; that is, it shall not, at any time, on purpose, or by neglect,
be withheld or diminished, during the continuance of his commis-