THE CHANCELLOR'S CASE.—1 BLAND. 623

this instance no such intention has been expressed; and, conse-
quently, upon common law principles, neither of those Acts are
now in force; and our statute book presents an entire blank so
far as regards the Chancellor's salary. Warren v. Wendle, 3 East,
205; The King v. Rogers, 10 East, 569. (t)

But, let it be conceded for a moment, and by way of argument,
that the effect of discontinuing or suffering this Act of 1798 to
expire, would be, that the Act of 1792 would be revived.—It cer-
tainly will not be contended, that the effect of the constructive
revival of the Act of 1792, would be a complete revival of the
whole of it, including all such clauses as had been repealed or
altered by any perpetual and now subsisting law. By a virtual
revival of a law nothing more has been ever understood to be thus
revived, than that which would have continued in force, had it not
been for the law, which was repealed or had expired. This is the
principle of a constructive revival, it goes no further. Now let us
* inquire, and endeavor to ascertain, on how much of the
Act of 1792 a constructive revival would, at this time, ope- 666
rate.

The two first sections of the Act of 1792, specify the amount and
duration of the Chancellor's salary; but, they make no provision
whatever for its payment. By the four last sections a particular
fund was to be raised, for that purpose, from taxes on proceed-
ings in Chancery and the land office. From that fund, the trea-
surer was directed to pay the Chancellor's salary, if it should be
adequate; if not, the deficiency was to be made up, not generally
out of any money in the treasury; but " out of any moneys in the
treasury arising or to arise from the sale of vacant land "—and,
it was declared, that "the said taxes shall be collected and paid
for five years after the end of the present Session of Assembly and
no longer." By the Act of 1797, ch. 51, every part of this Act
"relative to the said taxes and duties,"was continued during
the term of seven years, and until the end of the next Session of
Assembly; and by the Act of 1804, ch. 108, "the fifth section"
of the Act of 1792, ch. 76, was " enacted into a permanent law; "
provided "that it should be subject to any alterations which have

(t) Per HANSON, C., 1765, ch. 33, note.—It may be necessary to remark,
that the repealing clause of this Act, notwithstanding its expiration, is still
in force. There is an evident and material distinction between a temporary
Act containing a repealing clause, which Act is suffered to expire, and an
Act made for the purpose of repealing another Act, which is afterwards
itself repealed. In the first case, the Legislature declares its intention, that
an Act be done away and rendered void, and there is no proceeding of the
Legislature afterwards to restore life to the Act repealed. In the second
ease, the Legislature expresses the same intention, but afterwards by doing
away and rendering void the repealing Act, its intention cannot be construed
otherwise than to give new life to the Act repealed.—(Hanson's Laws of
Maryland.)