622 THE CHANCELLOR'S CASE.—1 BLAND.

ries us to the Constitution, where we find that positive, mandatory
clause, which prohibits the withholding or diminishing of the sala-
ries of the Judges during the continuance of their commissions.

The security of these judicial salaries, given by this Act of 1805,
ch. 86, therefore, is expressly rested upon exactly the same basis,
which sustains the salary given to the Chancellor, by the Act
of 1798. The only difference between the two Acts, is as to the
manner in which the foundation of their security and duration is
referred to. The preamble of the Act of 1805 leads us to the
foundation of the security and duration of the Judges' salaries,
by a direct reference to the Declaration of Rights. The Act of
1798, in a different manner, but, with equal certainly, leads us to
the same immovable basis, whereon we find the security and dura-
tion of the Chancellor's salary reposes. The Act of 1805 makes
a general appropriation, and directs the treasurer of the Western
Shore to pay quarterly. But, as to this, these salaries might have
been made payable, as by the Act of 1792, out of a special fund, to
be collected from taxes on proceedings at law or the like; or the
appropriation, whether general or special, might have been limited
to five years, as by the Act of 1792, or to two years, as by the Act
of 1798, or even from year to year, as by the several Acts continu-
ing the Act of 1798, passed since the year 1805. There is then,
in point of principle, when taken in connection with the Declara-
tion of Eights, no difference whatever between any two of these
laws relative to judicial salaries. They are all, alike, controlled
by the Constitution, which specifies the security and duration of
judicial salaries; and. in each the appropriation is suited to the
occasion, to the convenience of the State, or to the then opinion
of the General Assembly.

It may, probably, be said, that the suffering of the Act of 1798
* to expire, or, by the refusal of the Legislature to continue
665 it, the Act of 1792 was virtually revived and again in force.
There is not one syllable to be found recorded in the votes and
proceedings, of the last session of either branch of the General
Assembly, going to show, that such was the understanding and
belief of the Legislature. But, supposing such to have been their
opinion, the position is not correct, even on common law princi-
ples; and is utterly untenable according to our Constitution. It
is an established rule of the common law, that by the repeal of a
repealing statute, the original Act is virtually revived. But, that
is not the case now under consideration. It is this: The statute
of 1798 professes to repeal the prior Act of 1792, by substituting
other provisions, as to the whole subject, for which that Act had pro-
vided: and, then the Act of 1798 is, in general terms, limited to
two years. Now, in such a case, it has been adjudged, that the
prior Act does not revive after the repealing Act is spent; unless
the intention of the Legislature, to that effect, be expressed. In