G18 THE CHANCELLOR'S CASE.—1 BLAND.

of office, had the great seal of the State delivered to his keeping,
and entered upon the duties of his office. What was then the
salary assigned to the Chancellor, he contends does now, constitu-
tionally, belong to him; on the ground, that whatever was then
declared by law, to be the amount of the Chancellor's salary, was,
by force and operation of the Declaration of Rights, secured to
the Chancellor, who then came into office, during the continuance
of his commission.

The present Chancellor claims his salary under and by virtue of
the Act of 1798, ch. 86, and the thirtieth Article of the Declara-
tion of Rights. This Act of Assembly is entitled "A supplement
to the Act entitled an Act for establishing and securing the salary
of * the Chancellor." And it is enacted, "that the Chan-
660 cellor shall be entitled to receive, for all duties and services
whatever prescribed or to be prescribed by law, an annual salary
of twelve hundred and seventy-five pounds current money, and no
more, to be paid quarterly by the Treasurer of the Western Shore. ''
And then immediately follows the second section limiting the
duration of the Act in these words: " This Act to continue and
be in force till the twentieth day of October, eighteen hundred,
and until the next Session of Assembly which shall happen there-
after."

The limitation of this Act operates so far, and so far only, as it
is compatible with the Declaration of Rights. In so much as it
contravenes the Constitution, it is a nullity; but, in other respects,
it may be allowed to operate according to the express or implied
intention of the Legislature, This Act specifies the amount of
the Chancellor's salary; and, that amouut, not by the Act, but by
the Declaration of Rights, is secured to the Chancellor during the
continuance of his commission. So far, then, the Constitution ex-
pressly cuts off and prevents the operation of the limitation of the
second section. But, upon other matters, this limitation may have
its full effect. Upon the general appropriation, or authority to
pay that amount out of any money in the treasury of the Western
Shore, it may and does operate; because as to the fund to be
appropriated, and as to the mode of making provision for pay-
ment, the Legislature has a discretionary power; and, as to that,
they may make an express reservation of the right to appropriate
at pleasure, as was done by the Act of 1785; or, they may make a
a special, and, also a limited appropriation, as was done by the
Act of 1792. Because, as we have seen, the amount, and duration
of the salary being wholly distinct from the appropriation, or
" the provision for payment," as it is called by the Act of 1785,
the two first are secured, during the period specified by the Con-
stitution; and the other is at the pleasure of the Legislature.

The three Acts of 1785, of 1792, and of 1798, are, then, all of
them in their objects, intentions, and principles precisely alike, in