THE CHANCELLOR'S CASE.—1 BLAND. 617

* It may, therefore, belaid down, from the whole course
of the government; and from these solemn and well con- 659
sidered Acts of the Legislature, as a firmly established constitu-
tional principle, that the Chancellor's salary is a debt due to him
from the State; guaranteed, not by any Act of Assembly, but by
the Constitution; the appropriation for the payment of which is
to be made by the Legislature; that is, the amount being fixed, it
is to be paid, to use the words of the Declaration of Rights, " in
such manner, and at such times as the Legislature shall here-
after direct." Bearing in mind these three important, and settled
distinctions, between the amount, the duration, and the appropria-
tion for a judicial salary, let us now proceed cautiously to consider
the Act under which the present Chancellor claims his salary.

The council proceedings will show, that on the sixteenth day of
August, eighteen hundred and twenty-four, the present Chancellor
was unanimously appointed by the Governor and Council; and,

that, on the eighteenth day of the same mouth, he took the oaths

them so long as their commissions should, remain in force. And then it was
further enacted, "That such salaries of Judges as are now or shall become
payable out of the annual rent or sum granted for the support of his
Majesty's household, and of the honor and dignity of the Crown, shall,
from to time, after the demise of his Majesty, or any of his heirs and suc-
cessors, be charged upon and paid and payable out of, such of the duties or
revenues granted for the uses of the civil Government of his Majesty, his
heirs and successors, as shall be subsisting after every such demise respec-
tively, until some further or other provision be made by Parliament for the
expenses of civil Government, and from and immediately after the making
of such provision, and during the continuance thereof, such salaries shall
be paid and payable out of all or any of the moneys which shall be appli-
cable to such uses and expenses as aforesaid."'

Lord Coke, in speaking of the Court of Exchequer, informs us, that " the
Chief Baron is created by letters patent, and the office is granted to him
quamdiu se bene gesserit, wherein he hath a more fixed estate (it being an
estate for life,) than the Justices of either bench, who have their offices but
at will: and quamdiu se bene gesserit must be intended in matters concerning
. his office, and is no more than the law would have implied, if the office had
been granted for life. And in like manner are the rest of the barons of the
Exchequer constituted, and the patents of the Attorney-General and solici-
tor, are also quamdiu se bene gesserit.''—(4 Inst. 117.)

But notwithstanding what is here said by Coke, it would seem that any of
these officers might have been removed at the pleasure of the King, without
the institution of any judicial proceeding, or the interposition of Parliament;
for all the lawyers and historians of England speak of the constitutional
independency of the Judges as an improvement which was not finally es-
tablished until the year 1700, long after the death of Coke, (ante 615, note
(h); 3 Hal. Const. Hist. Eng. 262; Smollett Hist. Eng. ch. 6, 14 & 16.) It is
most likely, that the provision of our original Constitution, (Art. 40,) which
declares "that the Chancellor, all Judges, the Attorney-General, &c. shall
hold their commissions during good behavior," &c. was suggested by what
is here said by Lord Coke; which provision as to the Attorney-General has
however, been since altered, 1816, ch. 247, confirmed by 1817, ch. 69.