STRIKE'S CASE.—1 BLAND. 61

3d. For that the said report and statement is erroneous and de-
fective in point of law and fact; wherefore, the said defendant,
Strike, begs leave to except to the same, and that the said report
and statement may not be confirmed by this Court; but that the
same may be remanded to the said auditor, or set aside and an-
nulled.

After which the plaintiffs, by their petition, founded on the pro-
visions of the Act of 1824, ch. 196, prayed, that the case might be
removed to the High Court Chancery, upon which it was so ordered;
and all the original proceedings were accordingly transmitted and
filed here on the 15th day of June, 1825.

The case having been brought to a hearing upon the exceptions
to the several reports of the auditor, and for further directions; it
was much and strongly insisted, on the part of the defendant,
Strike, that under the concluding reservation of this decree, which
was altogether a new and peculiar one, every matter was now open
for discussion and adjudication, but the simple circumstance of the
sale of the property; that this decree was entirely in the usual
form, except the conclusion, which declares, that "all equities as
to the distribution of the proceeds of sale are reserved by the
Court for hearing on the trustee's report, on bringing into Court
the money or securities arising on the sale." That by the addition
of this peculiar clause, to be found in no similar * decree, it
must have been the intention of the Court to reserve all the 67
rights and equities of the parties for its consideration and adjust-
ment after the sale had been made.

BLAND, C., 10th April, 1826.—This case has been very elabo-
rately argued, and is now presented to the Court for the purpose
of being finally closed. It appears to have been warmly contested
in every stage. It has been partly decided, but there yet remains
much to be judicially considered and determined.

There is no principle, in relation to the administration of justice,
which it is more important to preserve, or more necessary to ad-
here to, than that there must somewhere be an end to litigation.
A matter which has been once solemnly decided, ought not, nor
cannot be reheard and readjudicated; controversy must have an
end, or society could have no peace. Errors of an inferior tribunal
may be corrected by a superior; and even the same Court, under
certain circumstances, will correct its own mistakes by motion,
petition, or bill of review. But no Court of justice can allow
itself to be engaged in the endless task of weaving and unweav-
ing; of progressing to an adjudication, and then going back to
readjudicate. Hence, whatever has been heretofore determined
in this cause must now be considered as finally settled, and in every
respect unalterable, except by bill of review, appeal, or in the
regular course of law. Attorney-General v. Bowyer, 3 Ves. 725.