

3d. For that the said report and statement is erroneous and defective in point of law and fact; wherefore, the said defendant, Strike, begs leave to except to the same, and that the said report and statement may not be confirmed by this Court; but that the same may be remanded to the said auditor, or set aside and annulled.

After which the plaintiffs, by their petition, founded on the provisions of the Act of 1824, ch. 196, prayed, that the case might be removed to the High Court Chancery, upon which it was so ordered; and all the original proceedings were accordingly transmitted and filed here on the 15th day of June, 1825.

The case having been brought to a hearing upon the exceptions to the several reports of the auditor, and for further directions; it was much and strongly insisted, on the part of the defendant, Strike, that under the concluding reservation of this decree, which was altogether a new and peculiar one, every matter was now open for discussion and adjudication, but the simple circumstance of the sale of the property; that this decree was entirely in the usual form, except the conclusion, which declares, that "all equities as to the distribution of the proceeds of sale are reserved by the Court for hearing on the trustee's report, on bringing into Court the money or securities arising on the sale." That by the addition of this peculiar clause, to be found in no similar * decree, it must have been the intention of the Court to reserve all the **67** rights and equities of the parties for its consideration and adjustment after the sale had been made.

BLAND, C., 10th April, 1826.—This case has been very elaborately argued, and is now presented to the Court for the purpose of being finally closed. It appears to have been warmly contested in every stage. It has been partly decided, but there yet remains much to be judicially considered and determined.

There is no principle, in relation to the administration of justice, which it is more important to preserve, or more necessary to adhere to, than that there must somewhere be an end to litigation. A matter which has been once solemnly decided, ought not, nor cannot be reheard and readjudicated; controversy must have an end, or society could have no peace. Errors of an inferior tribunal may be corrected by a superior; and even the same Court, under certain circumstances, will correct its own mistakes by motion, petition, or bill of review. But no Court of justice can allow itself to be engaged in the endless task of weaving and unweaving; of progressing to an adjudication, and then going back to readjudicate. Hence, whatever has been heretofore determined in this cause must now be considered as finally settled, and in every respect unalterable, except by bill of review, appeal, or in the regular course of law. *Attorney-General v. Bowyer*, 3 Ves. 725.