DUVALL v. WATERS.—1 BLAND. 549

The writ of injunction in cases of this kind, to stay waste pend-
ing a suit to try the right, has, in Maryland, taken the place and
performs the office, in all respects, of the ancient writ of estrepe-
ment. It is an injunction not founded on any privity of title or
contract whatever; it is an attendant upon and an auxiliary of the
action at common law, or the suit in this Court in which the title
has been or may be drawn in question; it follows and shares the
* fate of that suit, and cannot be dissolved upon an answer, in
any way, denying the plaintiff's title, until that suit has been 585
fully determined in favor of the defendant. Like an estrepemeut,
its restrictions do not extend to an inhibition of any ordinary use
of the land by the occupying tenant; for he is allowed to culti-
vate it as usual, and to take wood for fuel, repairing of houses,
for fencing and the like, so he does no waste or destruction to the
inheritance.

It must, however, be recollected, that there is no instance of this
Court's ever having interposed by an injunction to prevent a mere
trespass, not instant and irreparable where no suit had been insti-
tuted here or in a Court of common law, involving the title; for,
against the granting of such an injunction, which does not operate
as an auxiliary to a suit to try the right, the same reasons apply
here as in England. It does not fall within the jurisdiction of a
Court of equity to try the validity of mere legal titles; for all such
purposes recourse must be had to the ordinary tribunals of the
common law. A person can only come here to obtain the inter-
position of the conservative powers of this Court in cases where
the common law remedies are inadequate or to which they do not
at all apply. If the plaintiff's title is denied, and he acquiesces
in the denial by refusing to bring an action at law to have it
authenticated and sustained, he can have no ground to ask any
relief of this Court, founded on a claim which he himself thus
shrinks from having judicially investigated, or put into a course of
being legally established.

In conclusion I deem it proper to remark, that this mode of ap-
plying for this injunction by a .separate bill, was irregular and im-
proper; it should have been asked lor by a petition, filed in this
case, without praying for a subpoena to bring in defendants who
were already before the Court. The urgency of the ease may be
some excuse for the irregularity; but I shall in all cases as far as
practicable require parties to pursue the regular and proper course.

ample damages; it is certainly better, that an unlawful proceeding be pre-
sented, than that recourse be had to a Court of law, after the injury is done.

The Chancellor's opinion has not been changed by a perusal of the answers.
He regrets, that the point was not argued by the counsel.

It is ordered, that the aforesaid injunction be continued until the final
hearing of the cause, or the further order of this Court.