548 DUVALL v. WATERS.—1 BLAND.

other similar cases; but in no one of them does it appear that any
objection had been made, grounded upon the principles of the
English authorities, against the propriety of granting or con-
tinuing the injunction, because the plaintiff had stated, that his
title was disputed, or because the defendant had positively denied
its validity. And so too in cases of nuisance, although it is
necessary in England, that the individuals complaining of
the injury should have had their rights first established at law,
Mitf. Plea. 144, yet here, where an action or the proper proceed-
ing has been instituted to try the right, an injunction may be
granted to prevent the repetition or further continuance of the
nuisance until the right has been thus determined at law or in the
regular mode. Williamson v. Carnan, 1 G. & J. 184.(k)

no intention of setting the authority of this Court at defiance; and was igno-
rant that what he had done was wrong.

KILTY, C., 26th February. 1807.—The suit at law was to decide title and
location, and the injunction to restrain waste until those points were de-
cided. Therefore it is no sufficient answer for the defendant to say that the
land was his and the location unascertained, If the plaintiff, at law. is
tardy, the defendant must urge him to proceed. In consideration of the
excuses contained in the answer, and the plaintiff not pressing for a com-
mitment or fine; it is ordered, that the defendant Robert Dew be discharged
from the attachment on paying the costs thereof.

(k) PASCAULT v. THE COMMISSIONERS OF BALTIMORE.—HANSON, C.. 1 st March,
1797.—The motion to dissolve the injunction in this cause issued, being sub-
mitted, the bill and answers were by the Chancellor read and considered.

When the bill was presented to him for the purpose of obtaining the in-
junction, it was not his idea, that this Court ought to control the judgment
of the commissioners. It appeared to him, that whenever they exercise
their judgment on a subject, over which the law hath invested them with
power, and they determine on an act to which that power is competent, they
cannot with propriety be restrained. It was not his province to decide,
whether or not a street should be proved, or a sewer repaired, or whether
or not the Intended act of the commissioners would be beneficial to a major-
ity of the persons to be affected by the act. But he considered the power of
this Court rightfully exercised, on. the application of any person, who is ap-
prehensive of injury, in restraining a proceeding not authorized by law.
He conceived, that the power conferred on them by the Act of Assembly
referred to in the bill does not extend to the removing a pavement already
made, which was not even alleged to want repairs, and lowering a street for
the avowed purpose of changing the course of waters, against the consent
and remonstrance of any individual citizen, whose property is to be thereby
affected. The power conferred on them by the aforesaid Act of Assembly,
is to make, amend, repair, pave, and keep clean streets, alleys and lanes; to
make, amend and repair bridges; and amend, and repair sewers; and so
long as they bonafide exercise only that power, they will not be restrained
by this tribunal.

Now supposing the extent of their power to be only doubtful, and that the
complainants on bringing suit at law, and shewing, that they have been
injured by the commissioners' completing their intended act, might recover