502 WATKINS «. DORSETT—1 BLAND.

of Assembly, which direct the manner of suing out attachments,
have in express terms treated them as process ancillary to the
judicial powers of the Courts of common law only; have authorized
the use of them by any individual inhabitant of the United States
who maybe entitled to sue here; and have limited the extent of them
to the taking of the lands, tenements, goods, chattels, and credits of
the debtor in cases at common law only. 1715, ch. 40; 1795, ch.
56; 1825, ch. 114. In England it is laid down, that choses in action,
stock, debts, &c. are not liable to creditors; and that they cannot
be taken on a, fieri facias, or under a sequestration from Chancery,
*or be at all touched in equity for the benefit of creditors.
534 Dundas v. Dutens, 1 Ves. Jun. 196; Guy v. Pearkes, 18 Ves.
196; Franckyin v. Calhoun, 3 Stcan. 270; Pelham v. Newcastle, 3
Swan. 290; McCarthy v. Goold, 1 Ball & Beat. 389; Grogan v.
Cooke, 2 Hall & Beat. 233. The reason, it is said, why choses in
action, according to the general rules of the Court of Chancery,
are not liable to execution is, because the Court takes notice, that
the creditor has a method, by the ordinary rules of law, either to
compel satisfaction, by seizing the person; or, where the person
cannot be taken, by proceeding to an outlawry and taking the lands,
as well as effects into the hands of the king, which, as of course, are
then applied in satisfaction of creditors. Edyell v. Haywood, 3
Atk. 356. Now, as it is evident, that our process of attachment is,
in many respects, equivalent to this mode of obtaining satisfaction
by means of an outlawry, which was never in use here, and as this
Court must take notice of the remedy by attachment, it may well
be held, that a creditor cannot be permitted to come here for relief
in any case where he could obtain it by attachment at law. But,
where a party cannot obtain relief at all, either bj an ordiriary
execution, or by the extraordinary process of outlawry or attach-
ment by reason of the peculiar situation of the property, or the
equitable nature of the title to it, he may obtain relief by bill in
equity. Edgell v. Haywood, 3 Atlc. 352; Willis Plea. 115; Had-
den v. Spader, 20 John. 554; Ford v. Philpot, 5 H. & J. 312.

But the mode of obtaining relief by bill in Chancery must neces-
sarily be comparatively tardy and expensive; and where the fund,
thus pursued, consist of mere choses in action, the delay may afford
to a fraudulently disposed debtor ample time to place it entirely
beyond the reach of any process that can be issued by a Court of
equity; so that, after the creditor had thus obtained a decree in
his favor, he would be no nearer to relief than when he began.

I have met with no evidence of any well settled practice shew-
ing, that this Court had conceived itself authorized to allow a
party to sue out a judicial attachment, instead of any other exe-
cution, to obtain satisfaction of a decree, (e) Yet I can see no just

(e) RICKOTT v. HIGGINSON.—1720.—Subpoena for costs. Mr. Warman, sheriff
of Ann Arundel County, comes into Court and certifies, that Mr. Gilbert