WATKINS v. DORSETT.—1 BLAND. 501

cause, that statute is a defence given to a debtor against a credi-
tor; and here it is not the creditor himself who makes the claim.
Yet the result of what this defendant claims a right to do would
be the same as if the executor of Walter Clagett were here, as
plaintiff, asking payment and to have his claim sustained against
these parties as defendants. And, consequently, whatever defence
they would, in such case, be permitted to make, they ought, as
plaintiffs, to be allowed to have the benefit of in the form in which
the matter is now presented, at least so far as to bind this defend-
ant.

I am therefore of opinion, that the circumstances, and lapse of
time raise a conclusive presumption, that this claim of Walter
Clagett either never existed or has been satisfied.

Whereupon it is decreed, that the injunction heretofore granted
in this case be and the same is hereby made perpetual: and it is
further decreed that the defendant pay unto the plaintiff's their
costs to be taxed by the register.

*Upon this decree the plaintiffs demanded of the defend-
ant payment of their costs, which lie failed or refused to pay. 533

After which by their petition they stated, that they knew of no
property which belonged to the defendant, excepting what might
be reached by an attachment under the Act of 1715, ch. 40, s. 7,
and therefore prayed that such an attachment might be granted
to them.

BLAND, C., 12th January, 1829.—The solicitor of the plaintiffs
having been heard in support of their petition, the proceedings
were read and considered.

This petition exposes one of the still subsisting deficiencies of
our Code. It may be inferred from the general spirit of our laws,
that all the property of a debtor, of every description, should be
liable to be taken by his creditors in satisfaction of their claims.
By the common law, the personal property of the debtor, with the
rents and profits of his real estate only, were liable; but by statutes
derived to us from England, with some additional legislative enact-
ments of our own, the real estate of a debtor has been subjected to
be taken in execution by fieri facias, or attachment, and sold for
the satisfaction of his debts in like manner as his personal prop-
erty. 5 Geo. 2, c. 7; 1810, ch. 160; Ford v. Philpot, 5 H. & J. 315;
Barney v. Patterson, 6 H. & J. 182. There are, however, still
several kinds of property, which a debtor may hold, laying beyond
the reach of his creditor's execution.

Public stock, the stock of banks, of turnpike road companies, and
the like, cannot be taken in execution under a fieri facias, nor can
choses in action he made liable to creditors at common law, Hard-
ing v. Stevenson, 6 H. & J. 267, otherwise than by an original or
judicial attachment; Ford v. Philpot, 5 H. & J. 317; but the Acts