484 HODGES v. MULLIKIN.—1 BLAND.

the injury which he alone may probably sustain. The creditors, or
cestuis que trust under the deed of the 27th of April, 1810, are not
parties to this decree; and, therefore, their rights cannot be bound
by it; but nevertheless, if it is executed as it now stands, their
interests may be greatly embarrassed, materially injured, or per-
haps in some measure wholly sacrificed. If the real estate is sold
under it, the parties with whom they may have to deal will be
varied and multiplied; their case may be made more complex and
difficult; and a sale of the personal property will be attended with
at least the same consequences; and, in addition, it may be thereby
removed entirely beyond their reach. Besides, this decree upon
the proceedings as they now stand, would most grievously mislead
a purchaser under it. He would be warranted in concluding, that
the property had been discharged from the incumbrance of the
deed of trust; because the * Court itself had acted upon
514 that belief, which it was authorized to educe from the
answer of Mullikiu and the absence of any proof to the contrary;
when in fact it had not been so released and could not be pro-
tected against that incumbraace, because those creditors had not
been made parties. Finley v. Bank United States, 11 Wheat. 304;
Clifton v. Haig, 4 Dexau. 33.

According to these views of the case, and looking to these con-
sequences, it is perfectly evident, that this decree, if suffered to
stand and be executed, may work material injury to those who
ought to have been made parties to it, and who have never been
called upon or heard in any way: and as to purchasers, it may
operate as an instrument of deception and fraud. I feel it to be
my duty, as far as practicable, to prevent any proceeding of this
Court from being thus used; and not to suffer the parties by any
contrivance; or by the holding back of any circumstance, either
wilfully or negligently, to make any of the solemn acts of the
Court operate perniciously and unjustly upon the rights and inte-
rests of innocent persons. Gifford v. Hort, 1 Scho. & Left: 396,
399. For these reasons therefore I shall afford the parties an
an opportunity of rectifying this decree; and for that purpose
stay its execution until further order.

A mere bill of review would not be commensurate to the peti-
tioner's objects; he must therefore be allowed to file such a bill as
will introduce, as parties, all the creditors named in the deed of
the 7th April, 1810, in such a manner as to bring their interests,
in connexion with those of the present parties, fully before the
Court.

Whereupon it is ordered, that all further proceedings under the
decree of the second day of May, 1825, be and the same are hereby
stayed and suspended until the further order of this Court. And
it is further ordered, that the petitioner Benjamin Mullikin have
leave to file a bill, in the nature of a bill of review, as prayed;