HODGES v. MULLIKIN.—1 BLAND. 483

by the exercise of reasonably active diligence, have known, that
which he alleges he has recently discovered, it is not enough, that
the newly discovered proof was actually in his power at the time
the decree was passed; it must also appear, that he knew of
something, or that there was something in the case which might
be considered as a suggestion, sufficient to apprise him, that there
were such other facts and proofs pertinent to the case; and which it
was his duty to have searched for; and, if practicable, to have
brought in and put upon the record. 4 Vin. Abr. 412.

It may be admitted, that the credulity of the defendant Mullikin
has been played upon to a considerable extent, and that he has
even been misled by those from whom he sought information; but,
that by no means furnishes a complete justification of his gross
negligence. He himself admits, that his co-defendant Harwood
had told him, that the debts mentioned in the deed of trust were
not paid; that information it was his duty, as a trustee, to have
followed out until he had ascertained the real truth, before he
ventured rashly to compromit the interests of the cestuis que trust.
He ought, from that suggestion, to have obtained a full knowl-
edge of every material particular respecting those debts; the
entire * disclosure of the facts in relation to which, being
called for by the bill, ought to have been set forth by him in 513
his answer. Before he filed his answer, it was his duty to have
read and maturely considered the bill; and a very ordinary degree
of care also required of him an examination of the proceedings, in
which he would have found the answer of Harwood, in which the
fact of the specified debts being then outstanding was stated and
relied on as a defence, at least in preference to the claim of the
plaintiff. Instead of which, this defendant Mullikin, with a reck-
less negligence, which no Court of justice ought to tolerate, ap-
plied to the debtor, for whom he was surety, and to the solicitor of
the plaintiff, for information; and, resting on what he thus learned,
he filed an answer, carelessly drawn by the solicitor of the plain-
tiff, without ever having made the least inquiry in any other direc-
tion; although he had been thus amply apprised of the necessity
of doing so. If the interests of this defendant alone were jeop-
arded; and, if no other person than himself were likely to suffer
by letting this decree stand, I certainly could not open or modify
it in any one single particular. He, who has been so egregiously
negligent of his own rights, can have no claim to a rehearing, and
a repetition of that litigation which he has so carelessly suffered
to be terminated to his disadvantage. Finley v. Bank U. S., 11
Wheat, 304.

But, from the matters now disclosed, and for this purpose estab-
lished, it appears, that there are other views of this case, and
other consequences likely arise from this decree as it now stands,
than those which relate exclusively to the defendant Mullikin, and