420 JONES r. JONES.—1 BLAND.

on each of them, issued a fieri facias on the first judgment, and
had it levied upon his real estate, which was sold for a sufficiency
to satisfy the first judgment, leaving a surplus of £80, which was
then in the hands of the defendant. The only question was,
whether the State was entitled to a preference from the commence-
ment of the second suit, over any judgments obtained against
Blake, after that time. As to which it was held, that upon the
State's obtaining a judgment against its debtor, the Act of Assem-
bly. March. 1778, eh. 9, s. G, gave it a lieu upon his lands by rela-
tion from the commencement of the suit, into whosesoe\er hands
they might come; and therefore, that the State was entitled to
have its second judgment satisfied out of the surplus in preference
to any judgment rendered after the commencement of its second
suit. Darhhon v. Clayland, 1 H. & J. 546.

The Court is reported to have said, in delivering the reasons of
their judgment, that "the surplus of the money arising from the
sale of the said Blake's land, after satisfying the first judgment of
the State, remaining in the hands of the defendant, is to be con-
sidered as land, and subject to the attachment of the State, issued
on the second judgment, in preference to the claim of the plain-
tiff." Daddson v. Clayland, 1 H. &" J. 550.

But the only question was, whether the lien of the State con-
tinued to adhere to the proceeds of the sale. Whether they were
to be considered as realty or personalty, was, therefore, a matter
of no kind of importance; and so it appears from the general tenor
* of the arguments of the counsel, as well as of the opinion
452 of the Court. The question turned upon the construction
of the Act of Assembly as to the continuance of the State's lien,
and nothing more. The point, whether by a sale under the fieri
facing the real estate had been converted into money or personalty,
or whether the surplus was to be regarded as real or personal estate,
cobld not have arisen; because either alternative might have been
assumed; and, upon the principles laid down, the decision must
have been the same; and therefore, this point could not have been
in the mind of the Court and decided upon in that case. And be-
sides, this Act of Assembly, March, 1778, ch. 9, s. 7, does, in
itself, most manifestly regard the surplus as money or personalty;
for, it declares, that the sheriff shall sell the lands to the highest
bidder, and shall retain sufficient in his hands to pay the debt and
all costs, his own fees included, returning the overplus, if any, to
the debtor; that is, he shall from the money, into which the lands
have been converted, pay the debt, returning the overplus of that
money to the debtor.

There is therefore nothing to be found in that ease, when care-
fully examined, which can be considered as at all at variance with
the general and well settled principles of the common law, accord-
ing to which, in all cases where personal property has been legally