JONES v. JONES.—1 BLAND. 425

the life-time of the debtor. Sir William Harbert's Case, 3 Co. 12:
Winstead v. Winstead, 1 Hayw. Rep. 245; Beatty v. Chapline, 2 H.
& J. 19. Whence it clearly follows, that the sale of Jesse Jones'
lands made after his death under the fieri facias issued on Daw-
son's judgment was, in all respects, regular and lawful.

The next inquiry is, how far the judicial proceedings, to which
the real estate of Jesse Jones has been subjected, have produced
a change in its character, or converted it from realty into person-
alty ? And if it has been so converted, then it will become neces-
sary to ascertain the exact point of time at which that very im-
portant change was definitely effected.

The writ of fieri facias commands the sheriff to have the money
in Court, there publicly to pay the party. He may himself pay the
plaintiff, but if he does so, it will be at his peril; for he is onlj
perfectly safe in bringing the money into Court, according to the
express command of the writ. The sheriff cannot deliver the
property taken in execution to the plaintiff in satisfaction of
his claim; he must sell it and bring in the money. The pioperty
of the defendant is to be taken and converted by a sale into money;
and hence, if the judgment be afterwards reversed by writ of error,
the defendant shall not be restored to the thing in specie, but the
money for which it was sold; for the fieri facias gave the sheriff
authority to levy the money of the goods, so that he was obliged
to turn the goods of the defendant into money; and therefore, the
restitution must be of what the execution had taken from him,
which was uiouej, and not the thing itself, for then nobody would
buy. Gilb. Execu. 16 & 20. These are the well settled principles
of the common law in relation to personal property taken in execu-
tion under & fieri facias; and the statute having made lands liable
to the payment of debts, and subject to the like remedies and pro-
cess as personal estate,—it follows, upon the same principles, that
*where lands have been sold, under & fieri facias, they must
be considered as having been converted into personalty. So 451
that if the judgment should be afterwards reversed, the title of
the purchaser cannot be affected by it; for otherwise there would
be no security in purchasing at sheriff's sales. Davidson A'. Beatty,
3 R. & McH. 616; Barney v. Patterson, 6 H. & J. 204.

Hence the surplus of the proceeds of a sale of lands, as well as
of goods, remaining in the hands of the sheriff after a sale made
by him under a fieri facias, can only be viewed as the surplus of
that money which he was commanded by the writ to make and
bring into Court. And hence such surplus must be regarded in
all respects as a portion of the personalty of the defendant.

From a case reported, as having been considered and determined
by the General Court, it appears that Philemon C. Blake had given
two bonds to the State for the performance of his official duties as
sheriff; on which the State sued, and having obtained judgments