400 WILLIAMSON v. WILSON.—1 BLAND.

scind an appointment is always heard on a short notice; and a
receiver is in no case permitted to take charge of the property
without having first given bond with approved surety. So far
then this Chancery power is at least as little susceptible of abuse
as the process of replevin, as is shewn by the example furnished
by the defendants' answer. But, this is not all; there are other
safeguards against the abuse of this power. The Court always
reluctantly interferes against the legal title, only in a case of fraud
clearly proved, and of imminent danger; and a receiver will not
be appointed when the matter in dispute depends on the legal
title; unless strong grounds are shewn, and the profits are in im-
minent danger. Loyd v. Passingliam, 16 Ves. 59; Norway v. Rowe,
19 Ves. 148, note; Maguire v. Allen, 1 Ball. & Bea. 75.

Where a plaintiff is permitted to come into a Court of Chancery
in behalf of himself and other creditors, or may sue here because
of the equitable nature of his claim, and in respect of a fund in
the hands of the defendant, out of which he has a right to ask
payment, he may, under certain circumstances, have a receiver put
upon the property or assets liable to his claim. But under no other
* circumstances does it appear, that the estate of a debtor
423 may be put into the hands of a receiver at the instance of a
creditor. In most cases the application is founded upon the fact,
that waste, or peril has assailed or does then immediately threaten
the property in question. But there are cases in which it may
become necessary to interpose for the purpose of keeping the
profits of an estate in litigation apart from those arising from
another which is not the subject of controversy; on the ground,
that they are likely to become so inextricably mingled as to ren-
der it extremely difficult or impossible to make a correct estimate
of those of the litigated estate after the right to it shall have been
regularly determined. In such cases the Court will appoint a re-
ceiver of the rents and profits of the litigated property. As v, here
certain wharves were claimed by the plaintiff in opposition to the
City of Baltimore, a receiver was directed to collect the wharfage
ol those wharves, the right to which had been made the subject
of litigation, and keep it separate from that collected for the use
of other wharves under the authority of the city. The Wharf
Case, post, rol. ii.

This, however, is not the case of a third person attempting to
stop the course of a firm, or of any one then actually engaged in
trade; but is the case of a partnership where one of the partners
has averred, that their trading has ceased, and that the firm is
utterly insolvent, and thereupon asks for the appointment of a re-
ceiver as the only means of saving him and their creditors from
the fraudulent practices of his co-partners. Now, in cases of part-
nership it must strike every one, that to whatever extent of malig-
nancy, or fraud a partner might be urged or tempted to go in a