WILLIAMSON r. WILSON.—1 BLAND. 399

and properly the hand of the Court; but his appointment deter-
mines no right; nor does it affect the title to the property in any
way; it will not even prevent the running of the Statute of Limi-
tations. Tue holding of the receiver, is the holding of the Court
for him from whom the possession was taken; therefore, should
any loss happen it must be borne by him from whom the property
was taken, not by the party at whose instance the receiver was
appointed. Pow. Mort. 294, note ; 2 Mad Chan. 233.

But it has been argued, that a measure so prompt and vigorous,
as that which has been adopted upon the present occasion, may be
applied to the most pernicious purposes; that it is open to the
greatest abuse; and that the consequences of such a procedure
among commercial people, may become most mischievous and
irreparably ruinous in its operation. I have meditated upon what
has been urged in this respect.

That this Court should have the power in unusual and pressing
emergencies, at the instance of a party interested, effectually and
without delay to put its hand upon property, so far as to prevent
waste, inextricable confusion, or total destruction, seems to be
admitted by all to be clearly right, or at least highly beneficial.
The apprehension of abuse from such a power, when exercised by
means of a receiver, seems to have arisen from a contemplation of
the circumstances of this case. These parties were merchants,
who had been extensively engaged in trade in the great emporium
of our State. And, any merchant, it has been said, by means of
this power of the Court of Chancery, may have his counting-house
* closed, his trade broken up, and his commercial reputation
utterly blasted at a single blow, b\ a malignant application 422
for the appointment of a receiver, founded on a statement of facts
altogether fabricated and false.

There is one general answer, that may be given to this asser-
tion; which is, that the plainest, most temperate, and best guarded
forms of judicial proceedings, known to the common law, have been
abused and made the instruments of malice. Of which the multi-
tude and variety of the reported examples, in actions for malicious
prosecutions and arrest, afford too strong proof; and, even in this
very case, the defendants, by their answer, desire it to be recol-
lected, that the well guarded common law process of replevin has
been wantonly and grossly perverted and abused to their great
wrong and injury. But upon the present occasion, since these
applications have, of late, become more frequent, it may be well
to consider this matter more particularly.

A receiver is never appointed before answer, but upon very
strong special ground supported by affidavit; Duckworth v. Traf-
ford, 18 Ves. 283; or, as is the practice in this State, on a hill
sworn to by the complainant; or, in case of his not being in this
State, by some one conusant of the facts stated. A motion to re-