CHASE v. MANHARDT.—1 BLAND. 327

liable to be so applied, or that Kyd had obtained a prior assign-
ment or lien upon it, and that Manhardt compromised matters
with them in order to enable him, without further delay, to obtain
some satisfaction by means of the attachment laid in the hands of
Chase. It is true, that equity will in some cases relieve a party
from the consequences of a fraud, which has been practised upon
a third person. As. if the fraud practised upon Manhardt alone
had by any consequence or recoil injuriously rested upon the inte-
rests of Chase, he might have asked and obtained relief from this
Court. Clifford v. Brooke, 13 Vex. 132; Chesterfield v. Janssen, 2
Ves. 15C; Garrison v. Coif, 1 H. & J. 374. But in this case, the
squib aimed at Manhardt did not reach, or at all affect Chase; he,
therefore, can have no cause of complaint whatever upon that
ground.

In fine I am perfectly satisfied, that Manhardt's judgment
against Bryden cannot now be impeached in any way; that in ob-
taining the verdict in the attachment case, Chase was not taken
by surprise; and, that there has been no fraud practised upon him.
But that there was a mistake in the judgment of condemnation
obtained against him is absolutely certain. Indeed it is admitted,
that to some extent a mistake had been made, which it was agreed
should be corrected. The nature and extent of that mistake is
now perfectly ascertained in the manner and upon the principles I
have explained. Chase was accidentally and erroneously repre-
sented as being indebted to Bryden to the full amount of Man-
hardt's judgment against Bryden, when in truth the fact was not
so. This mistake must, therefore, be now corrected as was agreed.
The staying of proceedings at law. upon the ground that judg-
ment had been by mistake obtained for more than was really due,
is quite a common case,—one which is often presented to this
Court. In such cases the verdict is never disturbed; or a new
trial ordered.

Charging Chase with interest from the 17th of January, 1813,
when the debt became due, to the 13th of October, 1817, when
the judgment of condemnation was rendered, it appears that the
* whole amount then due from him to Bryden was $7,706,
and no more, leaving an excess of 81,620.62. For the one 351
amount the judgment will be suffered to stand;—for the other, all
further proceedings will be perpetually enjoined.

The bill prays, that the papers stipulated for by the contract of
the 26th of March, 1812, may be now delivered to the com-
plainant.

They have been brought in as exhibits referred to in the answer
of the defendant David Hoffman; no objection has been made to
their sufficiency; I shall, therefore, order them to be delivered
accordingly. The defendants Purviance and Hoffman having been