326 CHASE v. MANHARDT.—1 BLAND.

balance of the purchase money due to Bryden was due from him,
(Samuel Chase,) or from the said Richard M. Chase. * Hence
349 it is very evident, that neither the original, nor a copy of
his contract of the 26th March, 1812, could have been filed with
his answers; and, that he certainly did not in those answers state,
as a ground of defence, that he could not then be considered as
the debtor of Bryden, according to the terms of that contract;
because it had not then been peiformed by Bryden on his part.

The continuance at March, 1817, ''to await the decision in a
cause in Chancery," alluded to a suit which had been instituted
bj Manhardt against Bryden and others, and is still depending in
this Court, to obtain an injunction to prevent Chase from paying
or giving Ins notes to Bryden for the sum of $6,000, which had been
attached in Ins hands; and also to obtain certain disclosures in aid
of the attachment Miit. But it does not appear, nor is it alleged,
that it was founded on any special understanding or agreement
with this complainant, or that he was, in any lespect. misled by
any confidence he placed in that entry as a continuing and bind-
ing agreement. On the contrary, he says, ''that Sse relied upon
the said attachment's being continued as the said injunction was
then depending." But he does not allege, nor does it in any way
appear, that the continuance of the injunction involved, or em-
barrassed, or withheld from him any defence he might have made
as garnishee in the attachment case, or that in consequence thereof
he did not make any defence which he otherwise would have
made. The fact is, that the injunction from this Court, and the
attachment at law, both operated upon Chase, the garnishee, in
precisely the same way; the object of both was to prevent him
from paying what he owed, to Bryden himself, and to have it paid
into other hands. There is nothing which shows, that Chase was
taken by surprise by any movement in either of those cases, or by
proceeding in either pending the other.

Much has been said about the fraudulent and collusive conduct
of Manhardt, Bryden and Kyd. Bat it is not in any manner
shewn how any of their alleged frauds or misrepresentations could
or did affect the complainant Chase. It is admitted, that Bryden
was indebted to Manhardt; and, that Chase was indebted to
Bryden. Now, as the conduct of those persons did not in any
way affect Chase, or charge him with more than he really owed
Bryden, or enable Manhardt to recover more than he might law-
fully claim of Chase as the creditor of Bryden,—it is exceedingly
difficult to conceive how there could exist any fraud of which
Chase could * have any just cause of complaint. Admitting
350 everything that has been said upon this subject to be true,
it amounts to no more than this:—that Kyd and Bryden were dis-
posed, if possible, to prevent Manhardt from having Chase's debt
applied in satisfaction of his claim, on the ground, that it was not