244 LINGAN v. HENDBRSON.—1 BLAND.

judgment, that no judgment nor writ of enquiry of damages could
be against him, against whom the judgment was by default; be-
cause, although in trespass, one may be guilty and the other not;
yet in covenant, debt or other contract where it is joint, the one
cannot be convicted without the other; and here by the verdict
for one of the defendants, that the covenant was performed, it
appeared, that the plaintiff had not any cause of action; and
therefore should not have judgment; and so should it be, although
the defendant against whom the judgment was by default had
confessed the judgment. It was also resolved, that the defend-
ant should have costs on the verdict against the plaintiff, for now
it was a verdict against him, and that he should have neither
costs nor damages against the other. Porter v. Harris, 1 Le-
vintz, 63; Morgan v. Edwards, 6 Taunt. 394: Weaver v. Prentice,
1 Esp. N. P. C. 309.

In an action of trespass brought by Biggs against Benger &
Greenfield for entering his close and taking away his goods and
chattels, judgment was given against Benger by default; but
Greenfield as to the force and arms pleaded not guilty, upon which
issue was joined; and as to the entry and taking awaj of the
goods he pleaded, that Benger had leased to the plaintiff' the close
therein mentioned for a certain rent, which being in arrear, he,
the defendant Greenfield, took the goods as a distress, and there-
upon the plaintiff requested and gave him license to sell the goods,
and to pay the money arising thereby to the defendant Benger in
satisfaction of his rent, which was done accordingly. Upon which
issue was also joined; and a jury having been sworn to try the
issues and assess damages against Beuger, they found a verdict on
the issues for the defendant Greenfield, and assessed damages
against Benger. Upon a motion in arrest of judgment against
Benger it was held, that this case of a license cannot be distin-
guished from a gift of goods, or a release which destroys the cause
of action as to all the defendants; and therefore the judgment
was arrested as to both. Biggs v. Benger, 2 Ld. Raymd. 1372; 8
Mod. 217.

* Upon this general rule, that the shewing in any way
260 whatever, that the alleged cause of action never existed, or
that it had been extinguished, furnishes a complete answer to all
claim to relief, it has been settled, that if an obligee, by his will,
makes one of the obligors his executor, and dies, the action at
law is thereby discharged as against all; because there being at
law but one duty, extending to all the obligors, the discharge, or
suspension of the action as to one, extinguishes it as to all.
Chectham v. Ward, 1 Bos. & Pul. 630; 2 Fill. Ex'rs, 812. And
although in equity, and by the Act of Assembly, the debt due
from such executor is to be considered as assets in his hands, yet
the principles of law have not been altered in any other respect