LING AN v. HENDERSON.—1 BLAND. 243

ral, well * established elementary principles by which all
Courts of justice, as well those of common law as of equity,
are governed. They are merely modifications of the one great
fundamental rule, wrhich declares, that in so far, and no farther
than there is a cause of complaint can there be any foundation
for relief.

This matter is thus explained and exemplified by Lord Coke:
"In a plea personal against divers defendants, says he, the one
defendant pleads in bar to parcel, or which extendeth only to him
that pleadeth it, and the other pleads a plea which goeth to the
whole, the plea that goeth to the whole, that is, to both defend-
ants, shall be first tried; and of this opinion was Littleton in our
books, for the trial of that goeth to the whole; and the other de-
fendant shall have advantage thereof, for in personal action the
discharge of one is the discharge of both. As for example, if one
of the defendants in trespass plead a release to himself, which in
law extends to both, and the other pleads not guilty, which ex-
tends but to himself; or if one plead a plea which excuses himself
only, and the other pleads another plea which goeth to the whole,
the plea which goeth to the whole shall be first tried; for, if that
be found, it maketh an end of all, and the other defendant shall
take advantage hereof, because the discharge of one is the dis-
charge of both. But in a plea real it is otherwise; for every ten-
ant may lose his part of the lands. As if a praecipe be brought as
heir to his father against t\\o, and one plead a plea which exten-
deth but to himself and the other pleads a plea which extends to
both, as bastardy in the demandant, and it is found for him, yet
the other issue shall be tried, for he shall not take advantage of
the plea of the other, because one joint tenant may lose his part
by his misplea." Co. Litt. 125.

In an action of trespass for taking certain goods and chattels,
against two defendants, the one pleaded a special justification,
and the other not guilty; upon both of which pleas issue being
joined, a jury was sworn, who found a verdict for the defendant
on the special plea, and found the other defendant guilty, and
assessed damages and costs. Upon a motion in arrest of judg-
ment it was held, that if the one defendant justifies by the gift of
the goods so as to destroy the plaintiff's title, and shews, that he
could not have cause of action, which is found accordingly for
that defendant, although the other defendant be found guilty, yet
no judgment * shall be against him, because it appeared to
the Court the plaintiff had no cause of action. Martin v.
Ayliffe, Cro. Jac. 134.

An action of covenant was brought against two for not build-
ing a house for the plaintiff according to their covenant; judg-
ment was against one by default; the other pleaded performance,
and it was found for him. Whereupon it was moved in arrest of