236 LINGAN v. HENDERSON.—1 BLAND.

plainant to the relief prayed, * he cannot resort to the answer
250 of the defendant, the proof taken in the case, or any extra-
neous matter to supply the defect, Hovenden v. Annesley, 2 Scho.
& Lefr. 638; Kemp . Pryor, 7 Ves. 240; Wright v. Plumptre, 3
Mad. 481; West v. Hall, 3 H. & J. 223; for no evidence can be
received which is not applicable to some one of the material allega-
tions of the bill; Chicot v. Lequesne, 2 Vex. 317; Gordon v. Gordon,
3 Swan. 472; but in order to remove any doubt as to what was in-
tended by any indirect or ambiguous charge in it, its interrogating
part, as well as its prayers for relief, may be material and proper
to be considered for that purpose. Muckleston v. Brown, 6 Ves.
62; Saxton v. Davis, 18 Ves. 80.

The principal facts of which this case is composed, as set forth
by the bill, and upon which alone the plaintiffs can have any claim
to relief, are few and clear. They are these:—James M. Lingan,
in May, 1807, conveyed four hundred and twenty acres of land to
John Henderson, in fee simple, who then, or at any time after, gave
no valuable consideration for it, but having obtained possession,
retained it until his death. Which land Henderson was to account
for with Lingan, either by holding it in trust to be reconveyed to
Lingan, or by holding it as a purchase, and paying for it at the
rate of thirteen dollars and thirty-three and one-third cents per
acre, with interest thereon commencing one year after the day of
sale; but which purchase money has not been paid: of which facts
the plaintiff's, have no positive proof, sought a discovery from the
defendants. Some years after entering into this contract, John
Henderson died intestate, leaving a considerable estate, which
passed into the hands of the defendants as his legal representa-
tives. James M. Lingan also thereafter died, leaving the plain-
tiffs his legal representatives. These are all the material facts
stated in the bill.

After a plaintiff has thus distinctly set forth the facts of which
his case is constituted, showing it to be one of which may properly
be brought within the cognizance of a Court of equity, he may
then proceed, in his bill, to specify and ask for that kind of relief,
to which he thinks himself entitled. But if he expressly specifies
the relief which he proposes to obtain, and prays for none other,
either generally or specially; and the law will not allow the Court
to give relief of that kind, or the peculiar nature oi his case will
not warrant the granting of any such relief, then he cannot be
relieved at all, unless he consents to amend or alter the prayer of
*in his bill; for otherwise it must be dismissed. But, if the
251 bill prays generally for such relief as is suited to the nature
of the case, then, under such general prayer, the Court may, re-
gardless of, or without any special prayer, grant any such relief
as may be allowed by law, in consistency with the nature of the
case, whether the plaintiff asks for it orally or not; Beaumont v.