LINGAN v. HENDERSON.—1 BLAND. 235

cannot be considered as forming any part of those allegations upon
which an issue between these parties has been or might have been
joined. It is nothing more than a sort of exception to the testi-
mony which has been improperly foisted in with the return of the
commission, *and can be considered at most as standing
only as if made in argument at the final hearing. But, as 249
such, it is wholly inadmissible in any way; and particularly for
the purpose of excluding any proof merely because of the inferiority
of its grade, or because of its not being such written evidence as
might have been required had the Statute of Frauds been specially
relied upon.

In the next place, apart from the Statute of Frauds, the admis-
sion of this testimony is objected to on the ground, that it cannot
be received in so far as it goes to contradict or explain the receipt
of J. M. Lingan on the deed for the purchase money, or the memo-
randum of the 10th of June, 1807. The evidence given by this
witness is, however, introduced, not to contradict or vary any
part of the entire contract, but to supply deficiencies and to pre-
vent fraud, by shewing that of which the deed of conveyance says
nothing, and to corroborate, explain and fortify that of which the
memorandum of the 10th of June speaks ambiguously. Taken in
this point of view, this parol proof may well and consistently stand
with the deed, and so much of the whole contract, as has been
actually reduced to writing. Joynes v. Statham, 3 Atk. 389; Blag-
den v. Bradbear, 12 Ves. 471; Hartopp v. Hartopp, 17 Fes. 191; 6'o.
Litt. 222, b, n. 2; Pow. Mart. 200. A receipt, not under seal,
although it be strong, is not, in all cases, conclusive evidence of the
fact; Trisler v. Williamson, 4 H. & McH. 219; Hughes v. O'Donnell,
2 H. & J. 324; 4 Stark. EC. 1272; but a receipt for the purchase
money, such as this, endorsed by J. M. Lingan, the grantor, for
the sum of five dollars, the nominal consideration, on the back of
the deed, looking to the usage, in such cases, of making an abso-
lute conveyance, of which such a receipt is a mere formal part, leav-
ing the purchase money in fact unpaid, is considered, in equity at
least, as being, in itself, evidence of the lowest order. O'Neale v.
Lodge, 3 H. & MeH. 433; Dixon v. Swigget, I H. & J. 252; Higdon
v. Thomas, 1 H. & G. 145; Knight v. Pechey, Dick. 327; Sug. Ven.
& Pur. 386; Pow. Mor. 1062; Irvine v. Campbell, 6 Bin. 118; Duvall
v. Bibb, 4 Hen. & Mun. 113. This second objection, as well as the
first, must therefore be totally overruled.

It has been long and well established as a rule of law and equity,
that the plaintiff can only obtain relief upon the strength of his
own title as it existed at the time of instituting his suit, and not
on the weakness of the title of his adversary, or the imbecility of
his defence. Mitf. PL 141, 154, 232; Bar field v. Kelly, 4 Russ.
355; Watts v. Lindsey, 7 Wheat. 161. In general, if the facts
stated in the bill are not in substance sufficient to entitle the com-