212 HANNAH K. CHASE'S CASE.—1 BLAND.

late Samuel Chase held an estate in fee simple, of which this plain-
tiff is dowable.

But the bond of the 26th of February, 1806, it is said, shows
that the previous contract, of the 4th of the same month, accord-
ing to the true intention of the parties, is only to be regarded as
a mortgage; that it is not, as it purports to be upon its face, an
absolute sale; but a mere security for the loan of money from the
late Samuel Chase to James Bryden. It is true, the Court should,
in cases of this nature, look into the various contemporaneous
agreements and dealings between the parties to ascertain what
was their design, and the real nature of their contract. Sevier v.
Greenway, 19 Ves. 412.

This case is, however, susceptible of being still further simpli-
fied and reduced. Let it be supposed, that Brydeii had obtained
the entire estate in fee simple from Gough, Grant and Clarke; and
being so seized, that he alone was the grantor by the deed of the
4th of February. Then, let this bond, of the 26th of February,
be considered together with or even as a part of that deed. The
whole will read as an absolute sale, with nothing more than a con-
dition for a re-purchase.

That this whole transaction, from whatever point of view it may
be contemplated, can only be considered as an absolute sale, with
a condition or covenant for a re-purchase, is manifest; because, it
wants all the usual badges and characteristics of a mortgage. The
money paid was, so far as appears, a fair price for the absolute
purchase of such property; liable to much injury, requiring fre-
quent repairs, and of fluctuating fashion and profits. Although
Chase was not put into actual possession, yet Brydeu leased from
him, and held as his tenant. Chase received the rents and profits
for his own use and benefit, and gave no account of them what-
ever. * The chief value of this lot of land within the City
226 of Baltimore, consisted in there being a large edifice erected
upon it, which was occupied and used as a tavern: the loss of
which, if destroyed by fire or otherwise must have been borne by
Chase; as it was held at his risk entirely. Co. Litt, 205, N. 1;
Pow. Mort. 125, note P., and 138, note T. There was nothing of
that reciprocity so essentially necessary to constitute a mortgage.
It is as essential that the one party should have it in his power, at
some specified time, to compel the re-payment of the money, or to
foreclose, as that the other should have it in his power to redeem.
But, although Bryden might re-purchase for a stipulated sum at
any time, during the sixteenth year after the date of the contract,
yet Chase could not compel Bryden to pay any sum of money, at
any time: Chase took no bond, or other collateral security from
Bryden; nor is there any clause in any deed or conveyance, by
which Bryden covenants or promises to pay Chase any sum of
money. If the edifices had been destroyed, or the property had