HANNAH K. CHASE'S CASE.—1 BLAND. 211

Bryden, stipulating, in the condition, that if Bryden should pay
him the sum of $17,500, at the expiration of fifteen years from
that time, and not before, or within one year thereafter, and not
afterwards, that then he, Chase, would reconvey the property
called the Fountain Inn to Bryden. After which, on the 2nd of
April, 1811, Samuel Chase, Jun'r, one of these defendants, pro-
posed to purchase this property of the late Samuel Chase, and in
that proposal he speaks of the dower of the present plaintiff as a
then vested legal right. This proposal was matured, and the
property was conveyed by the late Samuel Chase to this defend-
ant Samuel Chase, Jun'r, in trust, or out of which he was to make
provision for Matilda Ridgely and Ann Chase, two others of these
defendants, and daughters of the late Samuel Chase.

It has been urged, that Bryden always understood this contract
between the late Samuel Chase and himself to be nothing more
than a mortgage: and that he instituted a suit in this Court to set
aside this absolute conveyance from Clarke to Chase, and to be
let in to redeem. It has also been urged, that Samuel Chase, one
of the present defendants, under a conviction that Bryden had a
good and available right, purchased his interest. This may be
all true; but surely the assertions of Bryden, however solemn or
formal, or the mere acts or allegations of any of these defendants,
not responsive to the bill, cannot be seriously regarded as a part
of the legal and pertinent proofs in the case. Therefore, all these
sayings and doings of Bryden, and of these defendants, must be
entirely put aside as foreign to the subject now under consid-
eration. There is then, in fact, no proof whatever, in relation to
the nature of the contract between the late Samuel Chase and
James Bryden. other than that afforded by these several deeds
and instruments of writing themselves.

The various contracts, made at different times, by the several
parties concerned, from Gough to the late Samuel Chase, exhibit
this matter in an obscure and circuitous form, from which it may
be, in some degree, relieved and shortened, without enfeebling
the pretensions of either of the present parties, by regarding
Gough, * Grant, Clarke, and Bryden, as the persons who
held the entire estate, legal and equitable; and us the gran-
tors in fee simple to the late Samuel Chase, for the consideration
of $17,500. It is clear from the indenture of the 4th of February,
1806, that the late Samuel Chase obtained the whole and entire
interest of all those persons, as well at law as in equity; and be-
came thereby vested with an absolute estate in fee simple. Be-
cause, it appears by the recitals of that deed, that he had paid
Gough and Clarke for the legal interest they held; and that he.
had also paid for the equitable interest of Grant and Bryden.
From this deed alone, therefore, there can be no doubt, that the