208 HANNAH K. CHASE'S CASE.—1 BLAND.

was an absolute determination by the Court, that the party had no
title. Drandlyn v. Ord, 1 Atk. 571; Mitf. Tr. 238; 2 Mad. Cha. 312;
Beam. PL Eq. 218. But the Chancellor could not, in those cases,
have given any determination in relation to the plaintiff's title to
dower in the Fountain Inn; because he was deprived of the means
of doing so by the agreement, which (simply directed, that those
suits as to that property should be dismissed with costs. No de-
cree which the Chancellor could have pronounced in pursuance of
that agreement, could have given to it any additional extent
221 * or force as a bar against the present plaintiff'. There
was, however, no formal decree ever passed in those cases; they
were closed on the 19th of July, 1819, by the short docket entry
" agreed," evidently in reference to this written agreement.

The question, therefore, recurs upon the agreement alone. It is
stipulated, that the bills be dismissed as to the property not in-
cluded in the agreement. It is a contract to abandon those suits;
but it is not a relinquishment of the right claimed by them. The
two things are substantially different; and that" difference, it ap-
pears from the whole phraseology of the agreement, was in the
then contemplation of the parties. Much is directed to be done,
to facilitate the speedy progress of the suit; the usual formal and
tedious mode of collecting testimony, necessary to a correct deci-
sion upon the rights of the parties, is dispensed with; and the
suits are to be brought to a close in a summary wray; but no right
is ceded, no title is relinquished by either party. On the contrary,
we are told, that the plaintiff is to recover; provided, and only
provided the Chancellor shall so determine. The defendants con-
cede to the plaintiff nothing, absolutely nothing. They, therefore,
can have no equitable ground to claim from her an abandonment
of her rights. The agreement, that the bills be dismissed must be
considered as referring to a mere voluntary dismissal by the plain-
tiff herself, which would leave her rights and interests untouched
and unimpaired in all respects whatever.

This agreement is not so explicit as it might, and perhaps ought
to have been; but, ater mature consideration, I find enough in it
to bring my mind satisfactorily to the conclusion, that it cannot be
deemed a relinquishment of the plaintiff's right of dower in the
Fountain Inn. The solicitors on both sides have contended, that
it is entirely unambiguous; and yet they have had recourse to the
proofs and circumstances to aid the interpretation respectively con-
tended for. A few remarks upon those circumstances and proofs
seem therefore to be required.

To the lease from the late husband of the plaintiff to Bryden,
of the Fountain Inn, she made a formal relinquishment of dower.
This lease did not expire until the 26th of February, 1821, some
years after the commencement of the two former dower suits.
This was an embarrassing circumstance. These defendants admit