HANNAH K. CHASE'S CASE.—1 BLAND. 207

ing such value; to be taken before some justice of the peace for
Baltimore County, residing in the City of Baltimore, b;v either
party, upon giving three days' notice. And it is further agreed,
that the said bills be dismissed as to all the property in the pro-
ceedings mentioned, not specified and included in this agreement.
And that the complainant pay the costs.''

The motives, ^ hich induced the parties to enter into this agree-
ment, are not expressed in the instrument itself; nor can they be
clearly inferred from any thing that is said in it. The first suit,
instituted by Hannah K. Chase and John P. Paea, seems to have
no sort of connexion with the subsequent dower cases. According
to the agreement, the plaintiffs, in that case, were to have a decree
ioi all they asked: and then it proceeds to speak of the dower
ca^es, without making any allusion whatever to that case. There-
fore, v\ hile confining our contemplation to the agreement alone,
*the first case, and every thing relative to it, may be wholly oork
laid aside. **U

Looking at this agreement, in relation to the dower cases aloue,
it seems to be wholly gratuitous, without any valuable considera-
tion whatever moving from either party. The plaintiff was to re-
cover nothing to which she could not produce a, clear subsisting
title. She was to be endowed of certain specified property, pro-
vided she satisfied the Court, that she was entitled to dower
therein. It is neither said nor insinuated, that she was to be
endowed of any one parcel of land, in consideration of her
relinquishing dower in anj other parcel. In short, she was to
be endowed of no land in which she was not legalH entitled to
dower; and to no gieater amount than its exact value, to be de-
termined by the Court. The plaintiff agreed to dismiss her bills
claiming dower, as to all the property not included in the agree-
ment, and to pay all costs. This concluding branch of the agree-
ment is perfectly in character with every other part of it. Like
the rest, it is merely gratuitous; and, consequently, according to
every principle of equity, it cannot be construed into a release
of any right, beyond the express and irresistible sense of the terms
used.

The words of the agreement are, that "the bills be dismissed."
Suppose this agreement had been followed out by a formal decree,
then the Court must have dealt with the matter in the manner in
which it was submitted; that is, it must have determined upon the
rights of the parties as to all the property specified in the agree-
ment; and as to the residue, it could only have ordered, in pursu-
ance of the agreement, "that the bills be dismissed with costs."
Bo ice v. Wood, 1 Jac. & Walk. 345. To make a decree a good and
available bar, in any subsequent suit, it is not sufficient merely to
shew, that the bill was dismissed; but the party must go further,
and shew, that the matter of the bill was res judicata; that there