that the powers of the convention were
not limited by the terms of the act call-
ing it into existence, the court said:
"The claim as to the superior power of
this convention over that of the legis-
lature is a mere flourish of words, and
will not stand the test of analysis. The
legislature, within its own province, as
defined by law, is supreme. To no
greater extent is a convention, which,
like the legislature, must derive its
power from the law. That the conven-
tion derived its power from the people
is true, but the power thus conferred
was limited by the people themselves to
the terms of the legislative enactment
under which the members of the con-
vention were elected. If this limitation,
or some other which defined the purpose
of the act, had not been embodied
therein, no reason would have been pre-
sented for requiring the people to vote
upon the selection of delegates to the
convention. In the absence, therefore,
of this or some other prescribed purpose,
the act would not only have been futile,
but absurd."
Under a Constitution which provided
for the calling by the people of a consti-
tutional convention upon a vote of two-
thirds of both branches of the legisla-
ture,10 the power of the legislature to
limit the powers of the convention in
the act calling it into existence was sus-
tained in State ex rel. M'Cready v.
Hunt (S.C.), supra. A constitutional
convention was called by an act of the
South Carolina legislature which con-
fined its purpose to considering, and
devising the means of redress from, cer-
tain acts of Congress laying duties and
imposts on foreign imports, for the pro-
tection of domestic manufactures, or for
the purpose of enforcing them. After
10 See State ex rel. M'Cready v. Hunt, 20
S.C.L. (2 Hill) 1,272 (1834).
346
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the delegates had been elected by the
people under that act, the convention,
in addition to dealing with the subjects
specified in the act, passed an ordinance
defining the allegiance of the citizens of
South Carolina as due to this state and
authorizing the legislature to provide
for the administration of suitable oaths
binding the citizens and officers of the
state to the observance of such, and
abjuring all other, allegiance. This act
of the constitutional convention was
held to be in excess of its powers, as
defined by the act calling the convention
into existence. On that proposition all
three judges agreed. O'Neall, J., said
(pp 222, 223) : "A convention assem-
bling under the Constitution is only the
people for the purposes for which it
assembles; and if they exceed those pur-
poses, their act is void, unless it is sub-
mitted to the people and affirmed by
them. It is true, the legislature can not
limit the convention; but if the people
elect them for the purpose of doing a
specific act or duty pointed out by the
act of the legislature, the act would de-
fine their powers. For the people elect
in reference to that and nothing else. . . .
It is clear that the convention had no
right to pass the ordinance defining alle-
giance, and to authorize the legislature
to pass laws to carry it into effect."
Rejecting the idea that the convention
possessed all the powers of the people
and might rightfully exercise them in
relation to all subjects, and in any man-
ner they might think fit, Johnson, J.,
said (p 242) : "In the appointment of
delegates to that convention, the people
acted upon the faith that they were to
be charged with those duties and no
others, and the assumption of any other
powers than those necessary to the at-
tainment of the objects in view would
have been a violation of the trust re-
posed in them, and an usurpation of the
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