of the electors voting thereon shall be
sufficient for ratification and adoption,
our opinion, in view of the legislative
precedents in this state, is that it has
that power. Whether the exercise of it
is subject to a power in the convention
to require a larger majority is one which
is not asked and which in the present
state of the authorities we prefer not to
answer. Of course if this question of the
necessary majority is submitted to the
people, their decision is final."
CASES SUSTAINING POWER
The courts seem to agree that the
powers of a constitutional convention
may be effectively limited by the terms
of a statute calling the convention into
existence which has been approved by
the people at an election held for that
purpose, State v. American Sugar Ref.
Co., 137 La. 407, 68 So. 742 (1915);
Foley v. Democratic Parish Committee,
138 La. 220, 70 So. 104 (1915) ; Hayne
v. Assessor, 143 La. 697, 79 So. 280
(1918) (recognizing rule); Wunderlich
v. New Orleans R. & Light Co., 145 La.
21, 81 So. 741 (1919); Sheridan v.
Washington Parish, 145 La. 403, 82 So.
386 (1919); Re Perez, 146 La. 373, 83
So. 657 ( 1920) ; Opinion of Justices, 6
Gush. (Mass.) 573 (1833); Loring v.
Young, 239 Mass. 349, 132 N.E. 65
(1921); Erwin v. Nolan, 280 Mo. 401,
217 S.W. 837 (1920); Re Opinion to
Governor, 55 R.I. 56, 178 A. 433 (1935),
supra, II; State ex rel. M'Cready v.
Hunt, 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) 1 (1834);
Staples v. Gilmer, 183 Va. 613, 33 S.E.
(2d) 45 (1945).
Where under a Constitution which
vested no authority in the legislature,
in its ordinary action, to provide by law
for submitting to the people the expedi-
ency of calling a convention of dele-
gates, for the purpose of revising or
was submitted by the house of represent-
|
altering the Constitution, a question
atives to the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts as to whether, if the
legislature should submit such a law for
the purpose of revising or altering the
Constitution in any specified parts of
the same, and a majority of the people
should decide in favor thereof, such
convention could propose to the people
amendments in other parts of the Con-
stitution not so specified, the justices
answered in Opinion of Justices, 6 Gush,
(Mass.) 573 (1833), that the delegates
would derive their whole authority and
commission from the vote of the people,
and that "upon the general principles
governing the delegation of power and
authority, they would have no right,
under such vote, to act upon and pro-
pose amendments in other parts of the
Constitution not so specified." At the
same time the justices called attention
to the fact that, in view of the lack of
constitutional authority in the legisla-
ture to pass such a law, it was difficult
to give an opinion upon the question
what would be the power of the conven-
tion if called. To the same effect is
Loring v. Young, 239 Mass. 349, 132
N.E. 65 (1921).
Where, under a Constitution which
conferred no express authority upon the
legislature to call a constitutional con-
vention^ the legislature passed a law
calling such a convention, the defined
province of which was to "consider"
amendments to the existing Constitu-
tion, and requiring the people to vote
upon the selection of delegates to the
convention, it was held in Erwin v.
Nolan, 280 Mo. 401, 217 S.W. 837
(1920), that the constitutional conven-
tion thus assembled had the power only
to "consider," but not to pass, constitu-
tional amendments, these amendments
not to become effective until adopted
by the people. Rejecting the contention
345
|
