rights of the people." And as against an
argument drawn from the supposed
absurdity of the legislature, an inferior
authority, putting limits to the power of
its superior and creator, Harper, J., had
this to say (pp 270, 271) : "The ques-
tion is of the authority of the conven-
tion. An ordinance is produced to us
passed by a certain number of individ-
uals assembled at Columbia. This gives
it no authority as an act of the people.
But we are told they were elected by the
people. This, however, is not enough.
For what purpose were they elected by
the people? To represent their sover-
eignty. But was it to represent their
sovereignty to every purpose, or was it
for some specific purpose? To this no
other answer can be given than the act
of the legislature under which the con-
vention was assembled. Certainly, the
people may, if they will, elect delegates
for a particular purpose, without con-
ferring on them all their authority. To
deny this, would be to detract from the
power of the people and to impose on
them a most inconvenient and dan-
gerous disability. If before the adoption
of the present constitution, the people
electing delegates in their primary capac-
ity, had, by a majority of their ballots,
specified a particular measure to be con-
sidered and decided in convention, will
it be pretended that the convention
would have possessed authority for any
other purpose? But the legislature in
passing the act for calling together the
convention were not acting in their leg-
islative capacity. The act has no rela-
tion to the general powers of legislation.
They were the agents of the people for
this particular purpose, and entrusted
by the Constitution to speak their voice.
But suppose there had been no such pro-
vision in the Constitution, and the legis-
lature had passed an act recommending
to the people to meet in convention for
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a specific purpose, and in pursuance of
the recommendation the people had
elected delegates accordingly, what
right or reason would I have to conclude
that the people intended to entrust this
convention with their authority for any
other than the purpose specified? This
would be plain usurpation on the power
of the people."
Although the provision in the Consti-
tution of Virginia concerning the calling
by the legislature of a constitutional
convention11 did not by its terms au-
thorize any restrictions on the powers
of the constitutional convention to be
called under that provision, but pro-
vided that upon a majority vote of the
members of each house of the general
assembly the question "shall there be a
convention to revise the Constitution
and amend the same?" should be sub-
mitted to the electors, and although in
another section12 the Constitution made
provisions for the adoption of constitu-
tional "amendments" by submission to
the people, it was held in Staples v.
Gilmer, 183 Va. 613, 33 S.E. (2d) 49
(1945) (the Chief Justice dissenting),
that it was within the power of the legis-
lature to enact a statute which, in sub-
mitting to the electors the question above
quoted, expressly purported to limit the
powers of revision and amendment of
the constitutional convention to speci-
fied subjects, in this case to subjects
dealing with the payment of poll taxes
by members of the armed forces. As
against the objection that it was beyond
the power of the legislature to limit the
scope of the constitutional convention
called by the people, it was pointed out
11 Section 197 of the Constitution, as quoted
in the majority opinion in Staples v. Gilmer,
183 Va. 613, 33 S.E. 2d 49 (1945).
12 Section 196 of the Constitution as quoted
in the majority opinion in Staples v. Gilmer,
183 Va. 613, 33 S.E. 2d 49 (1945).
347
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