lar legislation where outright
opposition to the legislation
would be politically dangerous.
6. A bicameral legislature prevents
unity in the legislature and so
precludes the success of any
legislative attempts to invade
the powers of the executive or
judicial branches or the powers
of the people.
7. A bicameral system prevents
corruption of the legislature.
Corruption of a single chamber
might succeed, but it would be
much more difficult to corrupt
both houses at the same time.
8. The bicameral system is tradi-
tional in the United States and
familiar to voters.
The foregoing arguments are assumed
by proponents of bicameralism to be
self-apparent. Research studies docu-
menting these claims are not available.
In addition to these direct arguments
for a bicameral system, proponents of
bicameralism attack certain features of
the unicameral system. Generally, these
attacks take the form of an assertion
that the unicameral system lacks some
desirable features found in the bicam-
eral system, in particular, checks on
popular passions and an independent
review. The specific features of the uni-
cameral system are not attacked as
undesirable in themselves.
ARGUMENTS FOR THE
UNICAMERAL SYSTEM
The case for unicameralism rests on
three grounds: (1) an assertion that
there is no justification for the present
bicameral system, (2) a positive plea for
the merits of unicameralism, and (3) a
refutation of the asserted deficiencies of
unicameralism.
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THE ATTACK ON BICAMERALISM
As noted earlier, justification for a
second chamber is no longer claimed on
grounds that the upper chamber protects
propertied classes or permits representa-
tion of different interests in the society.
It should be noted in passing, though,
that historically these were the two fund-
amental justifications advanced for the
bicameral system. With their demise,
justification of bicameralism has had to
fall back to secondary arguments which
unicameralists claim to be untenable.
The claim that bicameralism provides
a check on "popular passions" and on
hastily drawn legislation is vigorously
attacked by unicameralists. One aspect
of the attack involves basic differences in
the judgment of the proper role of the
legislature. Thus unicameralists assert
that a check on legislative action, purely
for the sake of blocking action disliked
by the minority, is undemocratic, and
one of the prime causes for the widely
recognized decline of legislative power
vis-a-vis the executive. Further, state
the unicameralists, the claimed need for
a review is a tacit recognition of the
inherently faulty nature of the bicameral
system with its confusion of responsibili-
ties that permits legislators to escape
public accountability for their actions.
If the legislature were properly struc-
tured, there would be little need for a
review of its work. On the practical
side, the unicameralists assert that the
so-called popular passion can dominate
both chambers, as it did in some legisla-
tures during the McCarthy era.' In this
view, protecting rights of unpopular
groups resides basically in an educated
citizenry and in the overall structure of
the constitutional system. Furthermore,
the branch of government that has raised
its voice against popular views in defense
of minorities has not been the legislature,
but the courts. Simply put, no data
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