supports the claim that the second
chamber acts as a constructive check on
the first.11 Conversely, United States
experience has shown that in normal
times the legislature is not inclined to
ride roughshod over the rights of the
well-to-do. Instead, the inclination is to
avoid action on important issues and
not to be influenced by popular pas-
sions.12
Unicameralists similarly dispute the
view that the second chamber acts as an
independent body of review to correct
faultily drafted legislation. Objections to
the claim fall into three major categories.
First, there is an assertion that, in fact,
an independent review is often not given
by the second chamber.13 For example,
bills are often received by the second
chamber so late in the session that it is
physically impossible to give them a
thorough consideration. Bills often are
passed hastily by the first house on the
assumption that they will be carefully
examined by the second chamber, an
assumption that is sometimes poorly
founded. With respect to noncontrover-
sial bills, in particular, it is claimed that
the second chamber seldom gives careful
consideration, and that such considera-
tion is often not given by the first cham-
ber either.14
The second category of objections is
that such checking or review that has
been done has not been demonstrated to
be of merit. The value of a check is not
measured by its extent, but by its wis-
dom. In the case of Vermont, where a
careful study was made of this point, not
one of the "checked" bills could be
11 national municipal league, model
state constitution 43 (6th ed. 1963).
12 american political science associa-
tion, american state legislatures 54
(1954).
13 Id. at 52.
14 Ibid.
110
|
classed as dangerous or seriously un-
wise.15 Similarly, the National Munici-
pal League states that there is no data
to support the claim that a bicameral
system results in better policies or more
carefully drawn laws.16
The third category of objections claims
that there is little need for a technical
review. The argument for a second-
chamber review antedated the rise of the
legislative council, of executive-spon-
sored legislation, and of professional bill-
drafting services. Important present-day
legislation has been carefully considered
and drafted before introduction into the
legislature, so that passage by one house
in itself constitutes an independent re-
view. A second chamber, with no special
knowledge of the problems or technical
competence in drafting legislation, has
nothing further to contribute.
Proponents of unicameralism give
short shrift to the claim that bicamer-
alism permits the killing of undersirable
but popular legislation. In the view of
unicameralists, this is but a tacit conces-
sion that bicameralism confuses responsi-
bility and permits legislators to hide from
the consequences of their actions, or, in
blunt language, that bicameralism per-
mits deception of the electorate. In the
unicameralist view, if the legislation is
popular but undesirable, legislators have
a duty to educate the electorate to an
understanding of the reasons why the
legislation is undesirable.
The claim that bicameralism prevents
undue aggrandizement of legislative
power is similarly rejected by unicamer-
alists. They point out that the claim
traces back to the days of the founding of
the United States constitutional system
when democracy was suspect and it was
anticipated that the legislature would be
15 shull, supra note 3, at 11.
16 national municipal league, supra
note 11.
|
